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I. DOCUTEL-OLIVETTI'S BRIEF IS INADEQUATE, PRIMARILY 
BEING AN ATTEMPT TO PROCEDURALLY DISTRACT THIS COURT 
FROM THE BONA FIDE ISSUES AND MERITS OF THIS APPEAL. 
Ignoring the contract provision it wrote, that "all 
disputes" be arbitrated, and paying no heed to the Federal 
and State legislative and judicial policies favoring 
arbitration and requiring that arbitrable disputes be placed 
in arbitration as rapidly as possible, Docutel-Olivetti [in 
response to Systems1 and Brady's simple demand for 
arbitration] has compelled Systems and Brady through a 
procedural economic death march over the last eleven months, 
thereby sky rocketing legal fees to a level in excess of 
$50,000.00 per side in its endless attempt to avoid, if 
possible, arbitration of its claim, which Docutel-Olivetti 
values at a mere $49,000.00. One procedural maneuver has 
been superimposed upon another by Docutel-Olivetti. Often 
the same procedural tactic has been repeated several times. 
Predictably, on this appeal, Docutel-Olivetti continues 
its effort to avoid the merits of the appeal in lieu of 
burdensome, endless and non-meritorious procedural 
arguments. For example, Docutel-Olivetti, devotes the first 
331/2 pages of its 49 page Brief to jurisdiction and other 
alleged procedural deficiencies. 
The intent of Docutel-Olivetti [which has not cross 
appealed here] is to fragment and dilute the nature of this 
appeal in the hope of distracting the Court's attention from 
the merits of the appeal by addressing non-existing 
procedural issues, not raised below. For example only, 
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Docutel-Olivetti did not challenge below the Trial Court's 
decision to apply the 1985 UAA, but now, for the first time, 
attempts to do so, rather than to meaningfully respond to 
the bona fide issues of the appeal. 
Also, Docutel-Olivetti, by its "matters of record" 
assertions, attempts to obscure this Court's understanding 
of Systems' and Brady's contentions as to what has happened 
below, before this Court on Motions, before Judge Greene in 
Federal Court, before the Tenth Circuit and before the 
American Arbitration Association (AAA). 
At the same time, Docutel-Olivetti inconsistently asks 
this Court to look beyond the so-called "record" so far as 
Docutel-Olivetti's arguments are concerned. Docutel-
Olivetti 's reasons for asking this Court to apply a dual 
standard to the "record on appeal" are two fold. 
First, Docutel-Olivetti hopes to prevail by causing 
ambiguity and uncertainty to replace clarity as to events 
favorable to Systems and Brady. Second, Docutel-Olivetti 
wishes to conceal from this Court several major and 
prejudicial inconsistencies in the positions of Docutel-
Olivetti, in the five forums identified above. 
Docutel-Olivetti should not be permitted to impose an 
artificial limitation on this Court's knowledge of all 
relevant events. Indeed, since all events in the five 
aforementioned forums relate to a common arbitration matter, 
where there has been no examined and cross-examined 
witnesses, and no trial evidence per se, common sense as 
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well as the Rules of this Court strongly indicate that a 
meritorious resolution of this appeal necessitates that this 
Court be accurately informed of the events in this and all 
other related proceedings. See also Rules 106 and 201, Utah 
Rules of Evidence and Rule 37(a), U.R.A.P. 
II. THE REINSTATEMENT OF THE FEDERAL 
APPEAL IS RELEVANT TO PROCEEDINGS HEREIN. 
The corresponding Tenth Circuit appeal and cross appeal 
have been reinstated following filing of the Brief of 
Systems and Brady herein. (A. 107). 
The reinstatement represents a material change in 
circumstances, which was properly brought to the attention 
of this Court by Systems and Brady. Seemingly, however, 
Docutel-Olivetti ignores the reinstatement in its Brief. 
Instead, Docutel-Olivetti attempts to convince this 
Court that it cannot review Judge Wilkinson's State Court 
anti-arbitration Order because of the existence of Judge 
Greene's Federal arbitration Order. At the same time, 
Docutel-Olivetti is arguing to the Tenth Circuit that the 
FAA §4 issues were submitted to and resolved by Judge 
Wilkinson, and are, therefore, not properly in Federal 
Court. The impact, or lack thereof, of Judge Greene's Order 
on this appeal is set forth in Section V of this Reply 
Brief. 
III. THIS COURT HAS JURISDICTION: THE ORDERS OF JUDGE 
WILKINSON ARE FINAL: THIS APPEAL IS ONE OF RIGHT. 
-3-
In a calculated and intentional effort to side step the 
merits and substance of this appeal and contrary to Rule 
24(k), U.R.A.P., Docutel-Olivetti, in Points II and III of 
its ARGUMENT [pages 18-32 of Respondent's Brief], presents, 
once more, its ill-founded and already four times rejected 
theories respecting the jurisdiction of the Utah Supreme 
Court over the present appeal. 
A. Docutel-Olivetti!s Attack on < 
Jurisdiction is Untimely 
Ignoring momentarily the prior orders of this Court 
vouchsafing jurisdiction, Docutel-Olivetti's present attack 
on jurisdiction can be rejected with finality because it is 
untimely. The interval of time during which a jurisdictional 
question may be raised by a party before the Utah Supreme 
Court is controlled by Rule 10(a), U.R.A.P., i.e.: 
(a) Time for Filing; Grounds for Motion. Within 10 
days after the docketing statement is served, a party 
may move: 
(1) to dismiss the appeal ... on the basis 
that the Court has no jurisdiction;... 
Docutel-Olivettifs present jurisdictional attack 
occurred on or about November 22, 1985, when Docutel-
Olivetti fs Brief was filed. However, the Docketing Statement 
of Systems and Brady was served on August 16, 1985. The time 
span between the two events is approximately 3 months, as 
opposed to the 10 day limit imposed by Rule 10(a) U.R.A.P. 
The apparent intent of Rule 10(a) is to require the 
presentation of bona fide jurisdictional questions to this 
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Court at a very early point in t.he appeal so that, if 
jurisdiction doesn't exist, the burden upon the Court and 
the parties can be immediately terminated. 
The Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure provide no 
express exception to the 10 day restriction of Rule 10(a) 
and, therefore, the present [November 22, 1985] attack on 
jurisdiction is not timely. 
While, in an appropriate case of manifest error, or 
complexity, or newly discovered evidence, this Court could 
belatedly [following the submission of briefs, for example], 
consider a bona fide issue of jurisdiction, such is not the 
case here. Docutel-Olivetti has merely reasserted the same 
old, stale, transparent, hollow, contrived and four times 
rejected arguments, in support of its present attack on 
jurisdiction. 
B. Docutel-Olivettifs Arguments 
Respecting Jurisdiction are Frivolous 
Docutel-Olivetti on June 24, 1985 conceded [in Federal 
Court] the appellate jurisdiction of the Utah Supreme Court 
as follows: 
Whatever else the May 24, 1985 State Court decision 
[i.e. the June 10, 1985 Order] is it is clear that it 
is not interlocutory.... 
Section 78-31a-19 of the Utah Arbitration Act [The 
1985 UAA] ... provides: 
"78-31a-19. An appeal may be taken ... from any 
court order: 
(1) denying a motion to compel arbitration." 
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Judge Wilkinson1s May 24, 1985 Order (sic) [May 10, 
1985 Order] is appealable under §78-31a-l9 U.C.A. and 
is not interlocutory. (Emphasis supplied; A.28). 
Thus, Docutel-Olivetti cannot now be heard to contend 
it did not know, as of June 24, 1985, that the present 
matter is appealable as a matter of right, is not interlocu-
tory and that this Court has jurisdiction. 
The initial appeal in this matter was Docket 20783, 
filed prematurely on July 8,1985. On July 10, 1985, 
notwithstanding its aforementioned concessions in Federal 
Court, Docutel-Olivetti challenged the jurisdiction of this 
Court by filing a Motion to Dismiss Appeal [Docket 20783] 
contending the appeal was interlocutory and governed by Rule 
5, U.R.A.P. [as opposed to Rule 4, U.R.A.P.]. (A.109,110). 
Docutel-Olivettifs assertions were rejected by this Court 
when it ruled that Appeal 20783 was governed by Rule 4 
[Appeal as of Right], but was unacceptably premature. 
(A.111). 
A new Notice of Appeal was, thereafter, timely filed in 
this matter, resulting in present Docket No. 20835. Again, 
Docutel-Olivetti filing a Motion to Dismiss Appeal 20835 on 
the same ground, i.e. that it was a Rule 5, U.R.A.P. 
interlocutory appeal. (A.112,113). 
Docutel-Olivetti also argued that the 1985 UAA was not 
procedural and, therefore, not retroactive, contrary to the 
express language of the Bill maturing into the 1985 UAA. 
(A.79,116,117). No such argument was made by Docutel-
Olivetti before the Trial Court. 
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The Utah Supreme Court on September 3, 1985 rejected 
Docutel-Olivettifs theories respecting its jurisdiction over 
the present appeal and denied Docutel-Olivettifs Motion to 
Dismiss in Docket 20835. (A. 118). 
For a third time, Docutel-Olivetti made the same 
arguments respecting jurisdiction in its Memorandum in 
Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Stay Pending Federal 
Appeal, filed on or about September 19, 1985 in this Docket 
20835. (A. 143). This third attack on jurisdiction was also 
rejected. 
For a fourth time, Docutel-Olivetti, on the same 
grounds, challenged jurisdiction in its Memorandum in 
Support of Plaintiff-Respondent's Motions filed on or about 
September 18, 1985 in this Docket 20835. (A. 147). This 
jurisdictional attack was likewise rejected. 
The arguments, now made for the fifth time, in support 
of Docutel-Olivetti's present [November 22, 1985] attack on 
jurisdiction are the same well-worn, but four times rejected 
contentions and have no more merit now than when they were 
four times earlier presented and rejected. 
C. This Appeal is One of Right and Judge 
Wilkinson's Orders are Final Orders 
This appeal is one of right and Judge Wilkinson's 
Orders of June 10, 1985 and July 19, 1985 are final orders 
for the reasons summarized below. 
1. Docutel-Olivetti has accurately conceded and is 
bound by its earliery admission against present interest, 
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made by its counsel as an officer of the Court, before Judge 
Greene in this matter, i.e.: 
Judge Wilkinson1s May 24, 1985 Order (sic) [June 
10, 1985 Order] is appealable under §78-31a-19 U.C.A. 
and is not interlocutory. (A.28). 
2. The decision of the State Trial Court was pursuant 
to the 1985 UAA, making this appeal one of statutory right. 
(R. 271). The State Trial Court's application of the 1985 
UAA, cannot be reviewed on a jurisdictional-dismissal basis, 
where the Trial Court applied the 1985 UAA. Only by 
exercising the jurisdiction vested in this Court under the 
1985 UAA and ruling on the merits of the appeal per se can 
this Court resolve the issue of whether Judge Wilkinson 
correctly applied the 1985 UAA. 
3. The Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure make a 
distinction between appeals as of right, under Rule 4, 
U.R.A.P., and discretionary appeals from interlocutory 
orders, under Rule 5 U.R.A.P. 
This Court applied Rule 4, U.R.A.P. [and, therefore, 
rejected Docutel-Olivettifs Rule 5 argument] in Docket 
20783. The mandate in Appeal 20783 has been returned to the 
District Court and the Rule 4, U.R.A.P. dismissal Order 
(A. 111) is res judicata upon the parties as to the issues 
so decided. 
4. The 1985 UAA applies in this matter because it is 
procedural by its terms, and, therefore, is retroactive. See 
page 36 of the Brief of Systems and Brady. Systems and 
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Brady, on May 24, 1985, asked the State Trial Court to apply 
the 1985 UAA and to grant them relief consisting of, among 
other things, an order of arbitration. (R. 274). Judge 
Wilkinson refused to compel arbitration and instead, in his 
June 10, 1985 anti-arbitration Order, compelled Systems and 
Brady to Answer Docutel-Olivettifs Complaint, in violation 
of the contract right of Systems and Brady that "all 
disputes11 be arbitrated. Accordingly, Systems and Brady have 
appealed Judge Wilkinson's anti-arbitration order of June 
10, 1985 and the companion Order of July 19, 1985, as a 
matter of statutory right under 78-31a-19, U.C.A., which 
states: 
An appeal may be taken by any aggrieved party as 
provided by law for appeals in civil actions from any 
court order: 
(1) denying a motion to compel arbitration. 
5. Even if Docutel-Olivettifs argument that the 
pre-1985 UAA controls here were correct [which it is not], 
the anti-arbitration Orders of June 10, 1985 and July 19, 
1985 are final orders [under the pre-1985 UAA when Lindon 
City v. Engineers Construction Company, 636 P.2d 1070 (Utah, 
1985) is also considered] and, therefore, appealable as a 
matter or right because they deny, with finality, the 
contract right of Systems and Brady to arbitrate "all 
disputes". 
6. Independent of the exact state statutory basis for 
jurisdiction in this appeal, the FAA and 28 U.S.C. § 1291 
provide an independent jurisdictional basis where, as here, 
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the transactions in question impinge materially upon 
interstate commerce. The anti-arbitration decisions and 
Orders of Judge Wilkinson are final under federal statutes 
because they expressly undertake to deny Systems and Brady 
the right to arbitrate "all disputes" and because Judge 
Wilkinson reversibly failed to implement a stay order under 
FAA §3 respecting the FAA §4 arbitration issues placed in 
Federal Court. 
7. The United States Supreme Court, in Southland 
Corporation v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 104 S.Ct. 852, 79 L.Ed. 
2d 1 (1984), has created controlling precedent and 
established a binding policy, applicable in the present 
matter, which requires that the Utah Supreme Court hear this 
appeal at the present time because Judge Wilkinson's 
anti-arbitration orders are final orders and the mentioned 
policy requires immediate review. 
D. Even if the pre-1985 UAA and the 1985 UAA 
Do Not Confer Jurisdition, the FAA Does. 
The argument of Docutel-Olivetti that the FAA 
supercedes [preempts] both the pre-1985 UAA and the 1985 
UAA, if true (which it is not), does not deprive this Court 
of jurisdiction, because the FAA independently confers 
appellate jurisdiction upon this Court. Since this matter 
involves interstate commerce, the FAA applies to questions 
of jurisdiction in both federal and state courts. 
More specifically, the U.S. Supreme Court, in 
Southland, supra, at 104 S. Ct. 856, 857 stated: 
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... the failure to accord immediate review of the 
decision of the California Supreme Court might 
"seriously erode federal policy." Plainly, the effect 
of the judgment of the California court is to nullify a 
valid contract made by private parties under which they 
agreed to submit all contract disputes to final, 
binding arbitration. The federal Act permits "parties 
to an arbitrable dispute [to move] out of court and 
into arbitration as quickly and easily as possible," 
Contracts to arbitrate are not to be avoided by 
allowing one party to ignore the contract and resort to 
the courts. Such a course could lead to prolonged 
litigation, one of the very risks the parties, by 
contracting for arbitration, sought to eliminate,.,. 
For 
review 
of the 
litigat 
us 
of a 
cont 
ion 
[or any 
. state -
.ract to 
has run 
othe ir appellate 
judicial decision 
arbi 
its 
.trate until 
course would 
Court] to delay 
L denying enforceme 
the state court 
I defeat the core 
•nt 
purpose of a contract to arbitrate. (Citations omitted; 
Emphasis added.) 
Under Southland, this Court is required to rule on the 
merits of present appeal and not, on a jurisdictional basis, 
deny the enforcement of the interstate commerce contract 
between the parties to arbitrate "all disputes" by allowing 
State Court litigation to first run its course. 
IV. THE 1985 UAA ISSUES WERE PRESENTED TO THE TRIAL 
COURT AND THE RULING WAS PURSUANT TO THE 1985 UAA. 
Docutel-Olivetti1s argument that the 1985 UAA was not 
before the Trial Court is mythical and clearly erroneous. 
The Motion for Stay Pending Arbitration itself was filed to prevent 
default before 1985 UAA took retroactive effect, but was not 
noticed for hearing. It was expected that the FAA §4 issues 
would first be resolved in Federal Court, after which the 
parties would return to State Court for appropriate relief. 
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On May 2, 1985, Judge Bruce J e n k i n s asked t h a t t h e 
S t a t e Court i s s u e s be heard f i r s t and con t inued t h e hea r ing 
on t h e Fede ra l Court i s s u e s u n t i l May 31/ 1985. Judge 
J enk ins asked t h a t t h e S t a t e Court h e a r i n g be a c c e l e r a t e d . 
Thus, t ime was s h o r t . (A. 7 , 8 ) . 
D o c u t e l - O l i v e t t i f s overdue Memorandum r e s p e c t i n g t h e 
Motion in q u e s t i o n was not served by mai l u n t i l May 16, 
1985. There was i n s u f f i c i e n t t ime remaining before t he May 
24, 1985 h e a r i n g t o f i l e an a d d i t i o n a l memorandum. 
Given t h e r e p e a l of t h e pre-1985 UAA (A.79; R.74) and 
t h e r e t r o a c t i v e implementa t ion of t h e 1985 UAA, t h e only 
s t a t e s t a t u t e a v a i l a b l e fo r Judge Wilkinson t o r u l e upon was 
t h e 1985 UAA. If Judge Wilkinson had ru l ed under t h e 
r e p e a l e d pre-1985 UAA (which he d id n o t ) , such would have 
been c l e a r l y e r roneous and r e v e r s i b l e e r r o r . 
At t h e May 24, 1985 h e a r i n g , t h e Motion of Systems and 
Brady was argued on t h e b a s i s of t h e 1985 UAA and the Court 
was asked t o not only g r a n t a s t a y under t h e 1985 UAA and 
pu r suan t t o FAA §3 , but t o o r d e r a r b i t r a t i o n pu r suan t t o t h e 
1985 UAA. More s p e c i f i c a l l y , Systems and Brady c h a r a c t e r i z e d 
an i s s u e before Judge Wilkinson as f o l l o w s : 
1. Should t h i s Court o r d e r a r b i t r a t i o n ? (R .274) . 
Systems and Brady also argued at the May 24, 1985 h e a r i n g : 
Since th is action has been filed, and after Defendants filed 
the i r Motion . . . the Utah Arbitration Act, 78-31A-1 became 
effective April 29, 1985 and Tit le 78 Chapter 31 has been 
repealed. The enrolled copy of Senate Bil l 62 declares i t to be 
"an act relating to the Judicial Code; providing a revised 
procedure for the enforement of written arbitration agreements."' 
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It is well established in Utah that procedural statutes have 
retroactive effect. 
... the legislature determined the new arbitration act as a 
procedural matter Defendants believe, therefore, that the new 
statute should be applied to these proceedings. (R.276). 
The 1985 UAA was provided to the Trial Court. (R.74-83). 
While professing a lack of information respecting the 
1985 UAA, Docutel-Olivetti did not claim suprise and ask for 
a continuance to consider the 1985 UAA. Instead, Docutel-
Olivetti waived any continuance available and submitted the 
matter at the May 24, 1985 hearing. 
The July 22, 1985 uncontroverted Affidavit of John R. Merkling 
also confirms that the 1985 UAA was before Judge Wilkinson: 
10. Based on the arguments which I heard before 
Judge Wilkinson, the issue of compelling arbitration 
under the new 1985 Utah Arbitration Act was explicitly 
raised and argued before Judge Wilkinson. (A.120). 
The understanding of Docutel-Olivetti and its counsel 
is no different: 
Judge Wilkinson's May 24, 1985 Order (sic) [the 
June 10, 1985 Order] is appealable under §78-31a-19 
U.C.A. and is not interlocutory. (A.28). 
The same is confirmed by the Objection of Systems and 
Brady to the June 10, 1985 Order which states: 
4. The [June 10, 1985] Order should state that the 
Utah Arbitration Act, 78-31a-1, et seq. was ... 
considered by the Court as controlling. (R.103). 
In response to the above-mentioned Objection, 
Docutel-Olivetti did not in any way challenge the applicabi-
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l i t y of t h e 198 5 UAA, nor t ha t the matter had been arguedf 
submitted and ruled upon under the 1985 UAA. Docutel -Ol ivet t i has 
conceded t h a t Judge Wilkinson "ruled primari ly on Utah law." (R.351 ) . 
On no o c c a s i o n , a t t h e t r i a l l e v e l , d i d D o c u t e l -
O l i v e t t i c h a l l e n g e t h e a p p l i c a b i l i t y of t h e 1985 UAA, n o r 
object t o the arguments of Systems and Brady t h a t the 1985 UAA cont ro l s 
nor objected t o the Cour t ' s ru l ing b a s e d on t h e 198 5 UAA. 
D o c u t e l - O l i v e t t i h a s n o t a p p e a l e d i n t h i s m a t t e r and may n o t 
a t t h i s l a t e d a t e r a i s e f o r t h e f i r s t t i m e a q u e s t i o n a s t o 
w h e t h e r t h e 1985 UAA was p r o p e r l y b e f o r e t h e T r i a l C o u r t . 
V. THERE ARE ISSUES UPON WHICH THIS COURT 
IS REQUIRED TO RULE. 
D o c u t e l - O l i v e t t i a r g u e s , a g a i n w i t h o u t c i t i n g any 
a u t h o r i t y , t h a t i n l i g h t of t h e FAA, t h e r e a r e no i s s u e s 
upon which t h i s C o u r t can e n t e r a r u l i n g . T h i s c o n t e n t i o n i s 
b a s e d upon t h e e r r o n e o u s p o s i t i o n t h a t t h e FAA, e n a c t e d i n 
1928 , p r e e m p t s t h e f i e l d , i n c l u d i n g t h e 1985 UAA. Such i s 
s i m p l y n o t t h e law and n e v e r h a s b e e n , any more t h a n t h e 
f e d e r a l s e c u r i t i e s laws p r e - e m p t s t a t e s e c u r i t i e s l a w s . T h i s 
C o u r t can i s s u e an a r b i t r a t i o n o r d e r u n d e r s t a t e l aw, t h e 
s c o p e of which i s b r o a d e r t h a n r e q u i r e d by F e d e r a l l aw, b u t 
i t c a n n o t award l e s s r e l i e f t h a n t h a t p r o v i d e d by t h e FAA. 
A l s o , D o c u t e l - O l i v e t t i a d d r e s s e s t h e Augus t 8, 1985 FAA 
§4 Order of Judge Greene (A. 159-161) as i f i t were f ina l in a res 
jud ica ta sense. To the contrary, Judge Greene fs Order has been appealed 
by both p a r t i e s and both appeals have been r e i n s t a t e d . (A. 107) . 
Furthermore, while calmly representing to this Court 
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t h a t t h e a r b i t r a t i o n i s s u e s under t h e FAA were p r o p e r l y 
before and decided in Federal Court, Docutel-Olivetti inconsistently in 
i t s Tenth Circuit Docketing Statement, has taken a contradictory 
posture, i . e . : that Systems and Brady submi t ted t h e FAA §4 i s s u e s 
t o Judge Wilkinson in S t a t e Cour t . (A. 132-135) . 
Should D o c u t e l - O l i v e t t i p r e v a i l in t h e Fede ra l 
c o n t e n t i o n t h a t t h e FAA §4 i s s u e s were before Judge 
Wilk inson , t h e f a i l u r e by Judge Wilkinson t o apply FAA §4 
would be s q u a r e l y before t h e Utah Supreme c o u r t , under t he 
Southland d e c i s i o n , which a t 104 S.Ct . 859, 860, s t a t e s : 
. . . the substantive law the Act [FAA] created was applicable 
in state and federal court We thus read the underlying issue 
of a rb i t rabi l i ty to be a question of substantive federal law: " 
the [federal] Arbitration Act governs that issue in ei ther s tate 
or federal court." . . . 
. . . the "involving commerce" requirement . . . [ is] not — an 
inexplicable limitation on the power of the federal courts, but 
. . . [ is] intended to apply in s ta te and federal courts. (Emphasis 
added; Citation Omitted.) 
Thus, i f t h e Tenth C i r c u i t r u l e s t h a t t h e FAA §4 i s s u e s 
were before Judge Wilkinson Judge W i l k i n s o n ' s f a i l u r e t o 
r u l e under FAA §4 i s r e v e r s i b l e e r r o r and t h i s Court would 
have an uncompromised duty under Southland t o then r u l e on 
t h e FAA §4 i s s u e s . 
This s i t u a t i o n i s p r e c i s e l y why Systems and Brady, by 
Motion before t h e Utah Supreme Cour t , sugges ted t h e p r e s e n t 
appea l be s t ayed pending a d e c i s i o n by t h e Tenth C i r c u i t . 
Thus, t h e Utah Supreme Court has before i t not only t he 
1985 UAA and o t h e r i s s u e s p r e s e n t e d in t he Brief of Brady 
and Systems, but may u l t i m a t e l y be o b l i g a t e d t o dec ide a l l 
FAA §4 i s s u e s . 
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VI. SERVICE OF A SUMMONS IS NOT REQUIRED WHERE A 
MOTION FOR ARBITRATION IS MADE IN A PENDING PROCEEDING. 
Docutel-Olivetti argues in its Brief, for the first 
time, that Systems and Brady's Motion regarding arbitration 
is deficient because it was not served by summons. 
The purpose of a summons is elemental, i.e., service 
thereof confers initial jurisdiction upon the trial court. 
There are other ways of conferring jurisdiction, e.g. by 
stipulation or by a general appearance. However, once 
jurisdiction has been obtained, the court may act thereafter 
on all matters relevant to the proceeding. 
Here, had jurisdiction not existed previously, the use 
of a summons under the 1985 UAA would have been appropriate 
to create jurisdiction. However, given the existing 
jurisdiction of the Trial Court pursuant to Docutel-Olivetti's 
Complaint and Summons, nothing more than the Motion to Stay 
Pending Arbitration was jurisdictionally needed preliminary 
to Judge Wilkinson's ruling under the 1985 UAA. 
Had Docutel-Olivetti possessed a true objection to 
"service of process", that objection would have been raised 
below. It was not, and is, therefore, waived. 
VII. DOCUTEL-OLIVETTI MISAPPLIES UTAH CONTRACT 
PRINCIPLES WITH REGARD TO ARBITRATION PROVISIONS. 
Docutel-Olivetti erroneously characterizes paragraph 12 
of its Agreement [which, with absolute specificity, provides 
that "all disputes" are arbitrable] as a "general" provision 
and, at the same time, characterizes paragraph 10 [which 
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refers to UCC remedies] as a "specific" provision. On this 
false premise, Docute 1-01 ivetti draws the misplaced conclusion 
that paragraph 10 must prevail over paragraph 12 because 
specific contract provisions control over general provi-
sions. 
Paragraph 12 of the Agreement, while broad in its 
scope, is neither general nor ambiguous under Utah law. 
Interpreting remarkably similar contract language in Lindon 
Cityy supra, this Court found that contract language 
providing that "... All claims, disputes and other matters 
in question arising out of or related to the CONTRACT 
DOCUMENTS or breach thereof ... shall be decided by 
arbitration ..." was "plain, clear wording," 
The language in the Agreement before this Court in this 
case is just as plain, clear and specific. Resort to general principles 
of contract interpretation is not required. Under the Utah law "all 
disputes" means "all disputes" and arbitration is required. 
Also, if there is any element of ambiguity, both state 
and federal law of contract interpretation requires that the 
contract be interpreted in favor of arbitration unless a 
clearly expressed intent not to arbitrate an issue can be 
found, which is not the case here. See Point I of Systems' 
and Brady's Brief and cases cited therein. 
Docutel-Olivetti does not deal in any way with the 
policy argument found in Systems' and Brady's Brief, at 
Point I. The principles cited there refer specifically to 
interpretation of arbitration clauses. In summary, Federal 
and Utah policy require that arbitration provisions be interpreted 
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in favor of arbitration. General principles of contract law 
do not override the stated Federal and Utah policy. 
Finally, Docutel-Olivetti!s position is fundamentally 
flawed in characterizing paragraph 12 as "general" and 
paragraph 10 as "specific". Paragraph 12 is the only 
provision of the contract which deals specifically with 
forum selection for dispute resolution. It is, in fact, 
specific and not general. Under paragraph 12 "all disputes" 
arising out of Agreement or in any manner pertaining to the 
dealership are to be arbitrated. Paragraph 10 deals at most 
with remedies [as opposed to forums] available under the 
UCC. Reference to UCC remedies does not identify a forum for 
the enforcement of those remedies. It is, of course, true 
that parties to an arbitration agreement may waive their 
right to arbitrate and proceed in court, but where one party 
insists on the right to arbitrate, as here, that right must 
be upheld. 
VIII. THERE IS NO UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 
EXCEPTION TO ARBITRATION. 
Docutel-Olivetti erroneously asserts that "credit 
claims are excluded from the general arbitration provision 
of the Agreement". Docutel-Olivetti fails to distinguish between 
remedies and tribunals [forums] for dispute resolution. 
Remedies comprise damages, orders of specific 
performance, injunctions, etc. Tribunals comprise courts, 
administrative agencies and arbitration panels. 
This distinction is carefully maintained by the Uniform 
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Commercial Code (UCC). There is no UCC exclusion of 
arbitration. Resort to a court is not compelled by the UCC. 
Docutel-Olivetti argues that there are references in U.C.A. 
70A-2-723O) to a "court*1 and not to arbitrators. This 
argument is entitled to no weight because U.C.A. 70A-1-
201(1) states: 
"Action" in the sense of a judicial proceeding 
includes recoupment, counterclaim, setoff, suit in 
equity and any other proceedings in which rights are 
determined. (Emphasis supplied.) 
An arbitration proceeding is certainly embraced by the 
UCC in the use therein of words such as "courts", "action", 
etc. The use in paragraph 10 of the Agreement of "remedies" 
available under the UCC is best understood by reference to 
U.C.A. 70A-1-201(34) which states that the term "remedy" 
... means any remedial right to which an aggreived 
party is entitled with or without resort to a tribunal. 
Docutel-Olivettifs analysis, therefore, is funda-
mentally flawed. Even by its own terms, the UCC is expansive 
enough to refer and to be applicable in arbitration as well 
as in state court. 
Furthermore, the UCC is subordinate to the Agreement of 
the parties. Docutel-Olivettifs thesis that the UCC 
supersedes a contract to arbitrate is false. On the 
contrary, U.C.A. 70A-1-102(3) states: 
The effect of provisions of this act may be varied 
by agreement, except as otherwise provided in this act 
and except that the obligations of good faith, 
diligence, reasonableness and care prescribed by this 
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act may not be disclaimed by agreement.... 
(4) ... the words "unless otherwise agreed" or 
words of similar import ... [do] not imply that the 
effect of other provisions may not be varied by 
agreement.... (Emphasis added.) 
By its very terms, therefore, the UCC is subordinate to 
a contract requirement to arbitrate disputes between 
merchants. In fact, arbitration finds its greatest 
application in commercial settings and is to be encouraged. 
There are numerous cases involving the UCC and arbitration. 
If there is an arbitration clause, the UCC does not prevent 
arbitration. See Medical Development Corp. v. Industrial 
Molding Corporation, 479 F.2d 345 (C.A. 10, 1973). The Court 
found, under the FAA and the California UCC, an unsigned 
arbitration provision was binding. 
Also the 1985 UAA is a part of the UCC. See U.C.A. 
70A-1-103, which states: 
Unless displaced by the particular provisions of 
this act, the principles of law and equity, including 
the law merchant ... or other validating or invalidat-
ing cause shall supplement its provisions. (Emphasis 
added.) 
The Utah UCC and the 1985 UAA must, therefore, be read 
as integrated and complimentary. The fact that Docutel-
Olivetti in its own contract designated arbitration as the 
required forum or tribunal does not violate the UCC. The 
remedies of the UCC are as available to Docutel-Olivetti in 
arbitration as they are in a court. 
In fact, Commercial Arbitration Rule 43, Appendix B-7 
of Olivetti's Brief, states: 
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The Arbitrator may grant any remedy or relief which 
the Arbitrator deems just and equitable and within the 
scope of the agreement of the parties.... 
Docutel-Olivettifs boot strap argument that the UCC 
mandates resort to a court is ill-founded. As required by 
the Agreement, "all disputes" mustf and should be, 
arbitrated notwithstanding the UCC. 
IX. THE EXTENT OF BRADY'S PERSONAL LIABILITY 
IS SUBJECT TO ARBITRATION. 
Docutel-Olivetti erroneously suggests that it may avoid 
the affect of its arbitration provision by merely suing 
Richard Brady personally under the Guaranty. 
Docutel-Olivetti has sued Richard Brady on the grounds 
that he is the alter-ego of Systems and, consequently, a 
signatory to the Agreement itself. Clearly, if Brady is a party to 
the Agreement, Brady's liability is arbitrable under the Agree-
ment. 
Also, Systems is entitled to have "all disputes" 
arbitrated. The liability of Brady is contingent and is a 
dispute arising out of the Dealership Agreement. The 
liability, if any, of Systems must be first resolved in 
arbitration before Brady can be said to have liability. 
In addition, the 1985 UAA requires that "issues" be 
submitted to arbitration. If the issue of liability of 
Systems is submitted to arbitration, that issue is removed 
from litigation as to all parties during arbitration. 
Furthermore, although a writing memorializing an 
arbitration agreement is required by the 1985 UAA, it is not 
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necessary that it be an integrated writing or that a party 
seeking arbitration have earlier signed the writing. All 
that is required is that the arbitration provision be in 
writing. See, e.g. Medical Development Corporation, supra, 
cases cited therein. 
Finally, Judge Greene of the Federal District Court has 
ordered that Brady be a party to the arbitration proceeding. 
Docutel-Olivetti submitted the issue of Bradyfs claim to 
arbitration to Judge Greene and Judge Greene has ruled that 
both Brady and Systems are entitled to arbitration. The 
Tenth Circuit appeal will resolve with finality the issue of 
Brady's right to arbitration. 
X. DOCUTEL-OLIVETTI WAS REQUIRED TO PREPARE 
PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW. 
Docutel-Olivetti suggests that Systems and Brady did 
not comply with Rule 4 of the Rules of Practice of the Third 
Judicial District and are, therefore, barred from arguing 
that the absence of findings of fact and conclusions of law 
is reversible error. The preparation of documents under Rule 
4 here was the responsiblity of counsel for the party 
obtaining the ruling, namely counsel for Docutel-Olivetti. 
(R. 108,109).Systems and Brady complied with their 
obligations in objecting to the lack of Findings and 
Conclusions in District Court. (R. 102-104). 
Findings of fact and conclusions of law are required 
because the Utah legislature, at U.C.A. 78-31a-4, has 
mandated that a court "shall determine those issues and 
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order or deny arbitration accordingly." (Emphasis provided.) 
Consequently, the District Court is under a legislative 
mandate to make its findings and enter its conclusions in 
conjunction with its resolution of issues. Its failure to do 
so here is reversible error. 
XI. A WRIT OF MANDAMUS IS NOT REQUIRED TO 
OBTAIN A SUBSTITUTE RECORD ON APPEAL. 
Docutel-Olivetti suggests that Systems and Brady have 
waived the Trial Court's error in not approving a substitute 
record because it did not bring a petition for a writ of 
mandamus. A writ of mandamus is a permissive remedy under 
Rule 65B and may be obtained where there is no other plain, 
speedy and adequate remedy. Moreover, mandamus is not 
available as a substitute for appeal. See Commercial 
Security Bank v. Phillips, 655 P.2d 678 (Utah, 1982) and 
Merrihew v. Salt Lake County Planning and Zoning Commission, 
659 P.2d 1065 (Utah, 1983). Mandamus is an extraordinary 
remedy available in certain circumstances, but not here. 
XII. DOCUTEL-OLIVETTI1S REQUEST FOR 
ATTORNEY'S FEES IS WITHOUT MERIT AND PREMATURE. 
Docutel-Olivetti also requests attorney's fees under 
the Agreement, although Docutel-Olivetti is in continual 
breach of that Agreement by failing to proceed to arbitra-
tion. Docutel-Olivetti is not meritoriously entitled to 
attorney's fees, especially in light of its abusive 
procedural tactics. The issue of attorneyfs fees may be 
advanced by Docutel-Olivetti only when, and if, Docutel-
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Olivetti prevails on the merits of its claim. The merits of 
Docutel-Olivettifs claim are not before this Court, were not 
before the District Court and should properly be in 
arbitration. Docutel-Olivetti is not presently entitled to 
an award of attorney's fees under its Agreement or on any 
other grounds. 
CONCLUSION 
Both state and federal law interpret agreements so as 
to favor to arbitration. Unless a particular disputes is 
explicitly and expressly excluded from arbitration, 
arbitration is to be ordered. This supports the state and 
federal policy of moving parties to an arbitration agreement 
out of court and into arbitration quickly and inexpensively. 
Docutel-Olivetti, unintimidated by its earlier rebuke and 
fine by this Court (A.108), continues to create numerous 
frivolous procedural roadblock. Docutel-Olivetti advances no 
meritorious reasons why the claims between the parties 
should not be arbitrated. The proceedings in this case 
underscore the wisdom of the rule enunciated by this Court 
in Lindon City, supra. This Court, therefore, should order 
arbitration of all disputes and stay the litigation below 
until the disputes are resolved in arbitration. 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed four true and correct copies 
of the foregoing Reply Brief of Defendants-Appellants, postage 
prepaid, to Gordon R. McDowell, 4609 South 2300 East, Suite 104, 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117, on this ~2.2*- day of vki-w , 
1985-
SEPTEMBER TERM - NOVEMBER 5, 1985. 
Before Honorable Monroe G. McKay, Honorable Stephanie K. Seymour, 
and Honorable John P. Moore, Circuit Judgesf United States Court 
of Appeals 
IN THE MATTER OF THE ARBITRATION 
BETWEEN DICK BRADY SYSTEMS, INC., a 
Utah corporation; RICHARD BRADY, and 
DOCUTEL-OLIVETTI CORPORATION, 
DICK BRADY SYTEMS, INC., a Utah 
corporation, and RICHARD BRADY, 
Plaintiffs-Appellees 
Cross-Appellants, 
v. 
DOCUTEL-OLIVETTI CORPORATION, 
Defendant-Appellant 
Cross-Appellee. 
Nos. 85-2349 & 
85-2460 
This matter is before the court on the applications of 
appellant and cross-appellant to vacate our order of October 7, 
1985, dismissing the appeal and cross-appeal* 
Upon consideration thereof, motions are granted* We conclude 
that the notice of appeal and notice, of cross-appeal were timely. 
It is ordered that the order and judgment entered October 7, 1985, 
is vacated insofar as it dismisses the appeal and cross-appeal. 
That portion of the order denying the defendant-appellant's 
application for an emergency stay of the district court's order 
remains in full force and effect. 
It is further ordered that the mandate issued October 7, 
1985, is recalled. 
^ HOWARDr K. PHILLIPS 7/ 
Clerk V 
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SUPREME COURT OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE CITY. UTAH 
November 4. 1985 
OFFICE OF THE CLERK 
Lynn G. Foster 
Attorney at Law 
602 East Third South 
Salt Lake City. Utah 84102 
Docutel-Olivetti Corp., 
Plaintiff and Respondent. 
V. No. 20835 
Dick Brady Systems. Inc.. Richard 
Brady and Does 1 through 10. 
Defendants and Appellants. 
Respondent's motion to remand to determine bond on 
appeal and to set dates for filing briefs, having been 
considered, it is hereby ordered that the same be, and 
hereby are both denied as frivolous and attorney for 
respondent is ordered to personally pay to the attorney for 
appellant the sum of $150 as and for attorney's fees 
forthwith. 
Geoffrey J. Butler 
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Gordon R. Mc Dowel1, Jr. #2180 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
4609 South 2300 East, Suite 104 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117 
Telephone: (801) 272-0309 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
FOR THE STATE OF UTAH 
DOCUTEL-OLIVETTI CORPORATION, 
Plaintiff-Respondent 
vs. 
DICK BRADY SYSTEMS, INC., 
et ai. 
Defendants-Appellant. 
MOTION TO 
DISMISS APPEAL 
3rd DISTRICT COURT 
Civil No. C85-506 
DOCKET NO.: 
The Plaintiff hereby moves the Court to dismiss the appeal 
filed by the Defendants on the grounds that the case is not 
appealable because a final judgment has not been entered in this 
matter on the Plaintiff's Complaint, and this appeal is interlocu-
tory in nature. Furthermore, the Appellant has not filed a super-
sedas bond and the appeal would in effect act as a stay of the 
Plaintiff-Respondent's right to have judgment entered on its credit 
claims asserted in the Complaint. 
Dated t h i s /L' day ot J u l y , icJB5. 
• \ i l 
& 
Gordon R. Mc Dowel1, Jr. 
A11o rney for P1a in t iff-Respondent 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
The undersigned hereby certifies that she mailed a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing Motion to Dismiss Appeal to the 
defendants-appellants herein, by placing said copy thereof in the 
United States mail, postage prepaid thereon, addressed to 
defendants' attorney of record as follows: 
Lynn G. Foster 
Attorney at Law 
60 2 East Third South 
Salt Lake City, UT 84102 
• ) 
this '''-' d a Y o f J u l Y ' 138^. 
Gayla R. Caspar, Secretary 
AI 1 n 
OFFICE OF THE CLERK 
SUPREME COURT OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE CITY. UTAH 
August 6. 19 8 5 
Lynn G. Foster. Esq. 
John R. Merkling. Esq. 
602 East 3rd South 
Salt Lake City. Utah 84102 
Docutel Olivetti Corporation. 
Plaintiff and Respondent. 
v. 
Dick Brady Systems. Inc.. et al.. 
Defendants and Appellants. 
No. 20783 
THIS DAY. Respondents motion to dismiss this appeal on the ground 
that the Order appealed is not a final order is hereby granted, and 
the appeal is dismissed. The notice of appeal was filed while 
objections to the order were pendirtg in the district court, and the 
notice had no effect under Rule 4(b), Utah Rules Appellate Procedure 
Geoffrey J. Butler. Clerk 
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Gordon R. Mc Dowel1, Jr. #2180 
Attorney for Plaintiff-Respondent 
46 09 South 2300 East, Suite 104 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117 
: Telephone: (801) 272-0309 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
FOR THE STATE OF UTAH 
I DOCUTEL-OLIVETTI CORPORATION, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
DICK BRADY SYSTEMS, INC., 
et al. 
Defendants-Appellants. 
MOTION TO 
DISMISS APPEAL 
THIRD DISTRICT COURT 
Civil No. C85-506 
DOCKET NO.: 20835 
The Plaintiff-Respondent hereby moves the Court to dismiss 
the appeal filed by the Defendants-Appellants on the grounds that 
the case is not appealable because a final judgment has not been 
entered in this matter on the Plaintiff's Complaint, and this 
j| appeal is interlocutory in nature. Furthermore, the Appellant 
jl 
lj has not filed a supersedas bond and the appeal could in effect act 
; as a stay of the Plaintiff-Respondent's right to have judgment 
; entered on its credit claims Asserted in the Complaint. 
DATED this vv/ day of August, 198 5. 
. y \ 
r v 
Gordon R. Mc Dowell, Jr. 
Attorney for Plaintiff-Respondent 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
The undersigned hereby certifies that she mailed a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing Motion to Dismiss Appeal to the 
Appellants herein, by placing said copy thereof in the United 
States mail, postage prepaid thereon, addressed to Appellants' 
attorney of record as follows: 
Lynn G. Foster 
Attorney at Law 
602 East Third South 
Salt Lake City, UT 84102 
this 22nd da.y of August, 1985. 
, . ^ / » -/'' 'L*s'isx4\e, 1£ 
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Gordon R. Mc Dowell, Jr. #2180 
Attorney for Plaintiff-Respondent 
4609 South 2300 East, Suite 104 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117 
Telephone: (801) 272-0309 
\ \ 
i(. ' \ \ ' r ! / 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 
THE STATE OF UTAH 
DOCUTEL-OLIVETTI CORPORATION, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
DICK BRADY SYSTEMS, INC., 
et al. 
Defendants-Appellants. 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF""*" 
RESPONDENT'S MOTION TO 
DISMISS APPEAL 
DOCKET NO. 20835 
Plaintiff and Respondent Docutel-Olivetti Corporation submits 
the within Memorandum in Support of its Motion to Dismiss the 
appeal herein. 
STATUS OF THE PROCEEDINGS TO DATE 
On January 24, 198 5 Respondent filed its Complaint in the 
Third Judicial District Court against Dick Brady Systems, Inc., and 
against Richard Brady. That Complaint is a credit collection 
claim alleging in substance that Dick Brady Systems, Inc. had re-
fused 'to pay for goods had and received by it from Respondent. 
Richard Brady was sued on a personal guaranty in which he guarantee 
the debts of Dick Brady Systems, Inc.• 
The Appellants were served with process on January 26, 1985 
and on February 12, 1985 the Appellants filed a Motion for Dismissa 
or Stay of Proceedings Pending Arbitration. Appellants' Motion was 
heard on May 24, 1985 and on June 10, 1985 Judge Homer F. Wilkinsor 
entered his order denying Appellants' Motion to Dismiss the pro-
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1 | ceedings and further denied the Motion to Stay the proceedings 
2 | pending arbitration. 
3 | On July 8, 198 5 Appellants filed their Notice of Appeal of the 
4 | June 10, 1985 Order and that appeal was assigned Docket No. 20783. 
The Notice of Appeal was filed in 20783 prior to entry by the 
court of its Order dated July 19, 1985 on Appellants' Motion to 
Reconsider the June 10, 1985 Order. On July 10, 1985 Respondent 
filed a Motion to Dismiss Appeal with the Supreme Court in Case 
No. 20783 and on August 6, 1985 the Supreme Court entered its Order 
granting Respondent's Motion to Dismiss Appeal and dismissed 
Appellants* appeal in Case No. 20783. On or about August 8, 1985 
Appellant again filed a Notice of Appeal of the District Court's 
June 10, 198 5 Order and that appeal has been assigned the within 
number 20835. 
On or about June 14, 198 5 Appellants filed its Answer and 
Counterclaim in the Third District Court. Respondent has responded 
to that Counterclaim. Appellants have refused to grant any discover} 
in the District Court on the grounds that its various notices of 
appeal divested the District Court of jurisdiction. Respondent has 
asked the District Court to compel Appellants to grant discovery. 
Appellants are resisting that motion on the grounds that the Distric 
Court does not have any further jurisdiction in the case because 
of the pending appeal herein. 
ARGUMENT 
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There Is No Final Judgment Or Order 
From Which An Appeal Herein Might Lie 
A1 15 
Rule 4 U.R.A.P. provides for an appeal of final judgments 
or orders. It is hard to imagine any proceedings less final than 
the proceedings presently pending before the District Court. The 
parties have barely gotten beyond the pleading stages therein 
and Appellants have even refused to grant discovery to Respondent. 
The Utah Arbitration Act Effective 
Apri1 lf 1985 §78-31a-l et. seq. 
Does Not Grant Appellant The Right 
To Appeal Herein 
Appellants rely on §78-31 (a)-19 U.C.A. as confering jurisdic-
tion on the Supreme Court for its appeal. §78-31(a)-19 does not 
by its terms provide an appeal of an order denying a Motion to 
Dismiss a Complaint nor from an order requesting a stay of pro-
ceedings. Moreover, §78-31 (a)-19 provides that an appeal may be 
taken "as provided by law for appeals." The law providing for 
appeals is found in Rule 4 U.R.A.P., appeal from a final judgment 
or order of a court/ and in Rule 5 U.R.A.P. providing for inter-
locatory appeals. As pointed out above, the proceedings before 
the District Court below are anything but final. Nothing in the 
Utah Arbitration Act permits an immediate appeal from denial of a 
Motion^ to Dismiss a Complaint or denying a motion to stay the pro-
ceedings below. Appellants may ask the Court to review the matter 
under Rule 5 U.R.A.P. but have failed to do so. 
The Utah Arbitration Act became effective after Respondent's 
Complaint was filed and served in the proceedings below. The Utah 
Arbitration Act in existence prior to §78-31 (a) et. seq. did not 
contain the appeal provisions of §78-31(a)-19. If that section is 
-3-
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1 I a rule of substantive law mandating immediate appeals depriving 
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the District Court of further jurisdiction in the matter, then 
that section does not apply to the case herein which was on file 
before the effective day of the Act. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above the Court should enter its 
order dismissing Appellants' Appeal herein. 
DATED: 
0 
Gordon R. Mc Dowell, Jr. 
Attorney for Plaintiff-Respondent 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
The undersigned hereby certifies that she mailed a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing Memorandum in Support of Respondents 
Motion, etc. to the Appellants herein, by placing said copy thereof 
in the United States mail, postage prepaid thereon, addressed to 
Appellants' attorney of record as follows: 
Lynn G. Foster 
Attorney at Law 
602 East Third South 
Salt Lake City, UT 84102 
this 22nd day of August, 1985. 
^«/A rf- & f'-J/L&\ 
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SUPREME COURT OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE CITY. UTAH 
September 3. 1985 
OFFICE OF THE CLERK 
Lynn G. Foster. Esq. 
John R. Merkling. Esq. 
602 East 3rd South 
Salt Lake City. Utah 84102 
Docutel Olivetti Corporation. 
Plaintiff and Respondent. 
V. No. 208 3 5 
Dick Brady Systems. Inc.. 
and Richard Brady. 
Defendants and Appellants. 
Respondent's motion to dismiss appeal, having been 
considered, it is hereby ordered that the same be. and 
hereby is, denied and the case is advanced on the calendar. 
All briefing is to be accomplished within 60 days. 
Geoffrey J. Butler 
H7M 
A 1 1 8 
LYNN G. FOSTER, #1105 
JOHN R. MERKLING, (12 2 39 
Attorneys for Defendants 
602 East Third South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Telephone: (801) 364-5633 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OE 
THE STATE OE UTAH 
DOCUTEL-OLIVETTI CORPORATION, 
Plaintiff, Respondent, 
vs. 
DICK BRADY SYSTEMS, INC., 
et al. , 
AFFIDAVIT OF JOHN R. MERKLING 
Docket No. 20783 
Defendants, Appellants. 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
ss 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE) 
John R. Merkling, having been first duly sworn deposes and 
says: 
1. I am an attorney for the Petitioners in the above-
entitled matter. 
2. On the 24th of May, 1985, I was present at a hearing on 
Defendants1 Motion entitled "Motion for Dismissal or Stay of 
Proceedings Pending Arbitrati on". 
3. I heard the arguments presented to the court by Lynn G. 
Foster on behalf of Defendants Dick Brady Systems, Inc. and Richard 
Brady, and the arguments presented by Gordon McDowell on behalf of 
Plaintiff Docutel-Olivetti Corporation. 
4. Prior to the hearing, I had prepared nn extensive typed 
outline of an argument for Mr. Foster's use at the time of hearing. 
-1 
In the ordinary course of business, Mr. Foster, to my personal 
knowledge, supplemented my extensive outline, in his own hand-
writing and before the hearing. 
5. I am personally familiar with and have knowledge of the 
typed notes which I prepared and the supplementary handwritten 
notes which Mr. Foster prepared. I examined them both before and 
after the hearing on May 24, 1985. 
6. Attached hereto as Exhibit "A" is the first page of the 
notes referred to which are in the handwriting of Mr. Lynn G. 
Foster. I saw this page both before and after the hearing before 
Judge Wilkinson. 
7. In connection with the hearing, Mr. Foster read 
extensively from the notes which he and 1 had prepared. 
8. I recall hearing Mr. Foster, in commencing the argument, 
read from Exhibit "A" and explicity call the Court's attention to 
the issue of whether the Court should order arbitration. 
9. Later during Mr. Foster's argument, based upon the 
aforementioned notes, Mr. Foster called Judge Wilkinson's attention 
explicity to the applicability of the 1985 Utah Arbitration Act, 
U.C.A. 78-3 la-1f et seq., which had become effective on April 29th, 
1985. 
10. Based on the arguments which T heard before Judge 
Wilkinson, the issue of compelling arbitration under the new 1985 
Utah Arbitration Act was explicity raised and argued before Judge 
Wilkinson. 
/ 
DATED this £'2 day of July, 1985 
/ / 
'JOHN R. ME RKLING 
(.  
&X-
Subscribed and sworn to before me on this c^  c V -^day of July, 
1985. 
- NOTARY PUBLIC "7/ 
My Commission Expires: 5 .,_/. ,>-? 
MAILING CRRTIF^CATE 
I hereby certify that 1 mailed n true and correct copy o£ 
the foregoing Affidavit of John R. Merkling, postage prepaid, to 
Gordon R. McDowell, Jr., 4609 South 2300 East, Suite 104, Salt Lake 
City, Utah 84117, on this J^iK'dny of July, 1985. 
Swtdtf H. /-£&U£*7 
(7d7*~A, s^?>^^ thrijpz^ /&<r&c2kP a ^ 
^I^TS fl^-J^ Cg>rP. / f t ' i r t v j f ^ . 
« ~ 
E x h i b i t - "A" 
LYNN G. FOSTER, #1105 
JOHN R. MERKLING, #2 239 
Attorneys for Defendants 
602 East Third South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Telephone: (801) 364-5633 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
DOCUTEL-OLIVETTI CORPORATION, 
Plaintiff, 
vs . 
DICK BRADY SYSTEMS, INC., 
RICHARD BRADY and DOES 1 
through 10, 
Defendants. 
AFFIDAVIT OF LYNN G. FOSTER 
Docket No. 20783 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE) 
Lynn G. Foster, being first duly sworn, deposes and states: 
1. I am an attorney for the Defendants in the above-
entitled matter. 
2. On May 24, 1985, Defendants1 motion for an order 
compelling arbitration entitled "Motion for Dismissal or Stay of 
Proceedings Pending Arbitration" was heard by Judge Homer J. 
Wilkinson. 
3. Defendants' Motion had been filed prior to the effective 
date of the present Utah Arbitration Act, IJ.C.A. 78-31A-1, et seq. 
However, on the date of the hearing the new [198rj] Utah Arbitration 
Act was effective. This fact was brought to the attention of the 
Court and the ruling of the Court was based on the Court's 
-1-
understanding of that Act. 
4. On May 24, 1985, Judge Wilkinson announced his decision 
from the bench denying Defendants an Order compelling arbitration. 
Counsel for the Plaintiff, Gordon R. McDowell, Jr., was ordered to 
prepare an Order. A copy of a first minuLo entry is attached hereto 
as Exhibit "A" and incorporated herein by reference. 
5. On about May 29, 1985, Mr. McDowell submitted a proposed 
Order. A copy of a first proposed Order attached hereto as Exhibit 
"B" and incorporated herein by reference. 
6. On about May 31, 1985, Defendants filed an "Objection to 
Proposed Order and Motion to Clarify", pursuant to Rule 4 of the 
Rules of Practice in the Third Judicial District Court, which 
requires objections to a proposed Order to be filed within five 
days of the submission of the proposed Order [and, therefore, 
before an Order is signed or entered]. A copy of Defendants' 
Objection to the proposed Order and Motion to Clarify is attached 
hereto as Exhibit "C" and incorporated herein by reference. 
7. A hearing on Defendants' objections was immediately 
scheduled and noticed for June 21, 1985. A copy of a Notice of 
Hearing is attached hereto as Exhibit "D" and incorporated herein 
by reference. 
8. It is the usual practice of the District Court to hold a 
proposed Order for a particular length of time, usually eight days, 
and, if no objection is filed within that period of time, to sign 
the proposed Order. If an objection is filed within the stated 
period, it is the practice of the District C^urt to hold the Order 
until the objection is heard. 
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9. Through a clerical error at the District Court, 
Defendants' objections to the proposed Order were not brought to 
the attention of Judge Wilkinson. Consequently, contrary to the 
practice of the District Court, Judge Wilkinson signed Plaintiff's 
proposed Order on June 10, 1985 [the June 10 Order]. A copy of the 
June 10 Order is attached hereto as Exhibit "E" and incorporated 
herein by reference. 
10. After the Order was signed, Defendants did not 
explicitly file a Motion under Rule 52(d) or Rule 59(e), both of 
which contemplate a Motion filed after the entry of judgment. 
11. On June 21, 1985, Judge Wil<inson heard Defendants1 
objections to the first Order, as well as other motions of the 
parties not relevant at this time. 
12. From the bench, Judge Wilkinson rendered his decision 
and ruled explicity that Rule 52 did not apply in this situation. I 
was instructed to prepare a proposed Order respecting the June 21, 
1985 hearing [second proposed Order]. A copy of a second Minute 
Entry is attached hereto as Exhibit "F" and incorporated herein by 
reference. 
13. On June 24, 1l)85, Delendants submitted the second 
proposed Order. A copy of the second proposed Order is attached 
hereto as Exhibit "G" and incorporated herein by reference. 
14. On June 26, 1085, Plaintiff objected to Defendants1 
second proposed Order and fil?d a proposed Order on behalf of 
Plaintiffs [third proposed Order]. A copy of the third proposed 
Order is attached hereto as Exhibit "H" and incorporated herein by 
reference. 
15. During the next week to ten days, I personally 
contacted Judge Wilkinson's clerk on more than one occasion to 
determine if either the second or the third proposed Order had been 
signed by the Judge, I was informmed by Judge Wilkinson's clerk 
that Judge Wilkinson was suffering from an illness which was inter-
ferring with the completion oi' certain matters, including this 
matter. 
16. Because Defendants1 original objections to the June 10 
Or;ler were filed under Rule 4 of the Rules of Practice of the 
District Court, and because Judge Wilkinson had explicitly stated 
that Rule 52, in his opinion, did not apply, Defendants filed their 
Notice of Appeal on July 9, 1985, within thirty days of the signing 
and entry of the first Order and after the District Court had 
rendered all decisions appealed from. A copy of the first Notice of 
Appeal is attached hereto as Exhibit "i" and incorporated herein by 
reference. 
17. On July 19, 1985, after Judge Wilkinson had recovered 
and returned to the bench, Judge Wilkinson modified and signed the 
third proposed Order [the July 19 Order]. A copy of rhe signed 
Order is attached hereto as Exhibit "J" and incorporated herein by 
reference. 
18. On July 31, 1985, Defendants filed an Amended Notice of 
Appeal as to both the June 10 and the July 19 Orders, specifically 
pointing out those portions of the July 19 Order appealed from. A 
copy of the Amended Notice of Appeal is attached hereto as Exhibit 
,fK" and incorporated herein by reference. 
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19. The facts that the District Court had signed a proposed 
Order before hewing timely filed objections, contrary to its usual 
practice, that defendants were proceeding properly under Rule 4 of 
the Rules of P: fctice of the District Court and not explicitly 
under Rule 52 >: Rule 59(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
and that Judge Wilkinson expressly ruled that Rule 52 did not 
apply, made th -> proper date for filing a Notice of Appeal 
questionable. It appears that Rule 4(c), of the Appellant Rules, 
controls. On */\ ly 9, when the Notice of Appeal was filed by 
Defendants in his matter, all decisions appealed from had been 
rendered by tie District Court, although a portion of the decision 
rendered sti] i needed to be reduced to writing. T am of the view 
that Rule 4(( ) does apply and that the original Notice of Appeal 
was proper a-e timely. 
20. •;: July 31, 1985, Defendants filed an Amended Notice of 
Appeal, particularly pointing out those portions of Judge 
Wilkinson's line 21, 1985 ruling to which Defendants objected, as 
(embodied by ''he July 19 Order, liven if Rule 4(b) U.R.A.P. were 
applicable ^ these proceedings (and T hoiieve it is not), any 
defect was :ured by the filing of the Amended Notice of Appeal on 
July 31, 19)5. 
21. On or about July 10, 1985, Plaintiff-Respondent, 
ignoring t: e requirement that the Docketing Statement be on file, 
filed a Mc* ion to Dismiss the Appeal on the erroneous grounds that 
the appea1 was "interlocutory" (that is, discretionary under Rule 5 
U.R.A.P.) i-nd that Defendants had not filed a supersedeas bond. 
Plantiff cid not file a memorandum in support of its motion. 
22. Appellants-Defendants responded to the Motion of 
Plaintiff-Respondent and to additional allegations made by 
Plaintiff in Plaintiff's reply M^mornndum. 
23. This Court has not sustained any of the arguments for 
dismissal advanced by Plaintiff. 
24. On August 6, 1985, this Court [apparently on its own 
motion] dismissed this Appeal' pursuant to Rule 4(b) U.R.A.P. 
Defendants have not had an opportunity to be heard and present 
arguments in opposition to dismissal under Rule 4(b) U.R.A.P. 
25. After Defendants' Notice of Appeal was filed, and 
before the Supreme Court entered any Order of Dismissal, Plaintiff 
has attempted to proceed with discovery and has asserted that it 
has accrued various discovery rights during this period. Unless 
this appeal is reinstated, Defendants may suffer substantial 
prejudice regarding their rights, and will certainly have to defend 
against Plaintiff's assertion of its claims at additional costs and 
delay. Plaintiff's counsel has already indicated his intention to 
raise these issues in a loiter dated August 12, 198fi>, a copy of 
which is attached hereto as Kxhibit "L" and incorporated herein by 
reference. These circumstances represent just cause for reinstating 
this appeal. 
26. Immediately upon receiving a copy of the August 6, 1985 
Order, Defendants filed a further new (third) Notice of Appeal on 
August 8, 1985, paying additional filing and docketing fees. A copy 
of the August 8, 1985 Notice of Appeal showing payment of the 
additional fees is attached hereto as Exhibit "M" and incorporated 
herein by reference. A receipt Tor the additional docketing fee has 
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not yet been received from the clerk of the Supreme Court, 
FURTHER Affiant sayeth naught. 
Subscribed and sworn to before me on this / ^ day of 
August, 1985 
/p+~ )?k>. 
[SEA.1 
NOTARY 3 j» 
)TARY PUBLIC 
'Commission Expire 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing Affidavit of Lynn G. Foster to Gordon R. McDowell, 
Jr., 4609 South 2300 East, Suite 104, Salt Lake City, Utah 84117, 
on this fJrfrl day of August, 1985. 
s"7 a 
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Gordon R. Mc Dowell, Jr. #2180 
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant 
4609 South 2300 East, Suite 104 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117 
Telephone: (801) 272-0309 
UNITED STATE COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 
IN THE MATTER OF THE ARBITRATION 
BETWEEN DICK BRADY SYSTEMS, INC., 
a Utah corporation, and RICHARD 
BRADY, 
Plaintiffs-Appellees, 
vs. 
DOCUTEL-OLIVETTI CORPORATION, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
DOCKETING STATEMENT 
No . 85-2L 
/ « 
\ 
/. 
Defendant and Appellant Docutel-Olivetti CotagS 
("Appellant") pursuant to Rule 8 of the Rules of Court of the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit submits the 
within Docketing Statement. 
(a) 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF 
THE PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a final order of the United States 
District Court for the Central District of Utah ordering arbitra-
tion under 9 U.S.C. §4, enjoining prosecution of certain claim's 
in the state courts of the State of Utah, ordering arbitration in 
Salt Lake City, Utah, and ordering other arbitration proceedings 
pending in Dallas, Texas transferred to Salt Lake City, Utah and 
consolidated with arbitration proceedings ordered in the order 
appealled herein. 
(b) 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. On February 22, 1982 Appellant's predecessor in interest, 
Olivetti Corporation, and Dick Brady Systems, Inc. ("DBS"), 
Appellee herein, entered into a Dealership Agreement which con-
tained an Arbitration Agreement which provided a forum selection 
clause as follows: 
"The arbitration hearing shall be conducted 
at the regional office of A.A.A. closest to 
the principal office of the party against 
whom arbitration is demanded, unless Olivetti 
and Dealer agree upon a different location." 
2. The regional office of the A.A.A. closest to Appellant's 
principal office is Dallas, Texas. The regional office of the 
A.A.A. closest to DBS principal office is Denver, Colorado. There 
is no office of the A.A.A. in Utah. 
3. Appellant has never agreed to arbitration in any location 
other than as called for in the Dealership Agreement. 
4. On or about March 8, 1985 DBS and Richard Brady ("Brady"), 
another Appellee herein, filed a^  Demand for Arbitration with the 
American Arbitration Association in Denver, Colorado asserting 
claims against Appellant and asking for unspecified monetary 
damages. Appellant has never demanded arbitration against DBS. 
Appellant responded to the demand and commenced to participate in 
arbitration proceedings in connection with the claims asserted by 
DBS against Appellant. On May 2, 1985 Appellees filed a Change of 
Claim with the A.A.A. asserting specific claims against Appellant. 
Appellant responded to that Change of Claim. 
-2-
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5. After seeking input from DBS and Appellant concerning 
the appropriate location for the arbitration proceedings, the 
A.A.A. transferred the proceedings to Dallas, Texas, 
6. On or about February 22, 1982 Brady executed a personal 
guaranty guaranteeing payment to Appellant's successor Olivetti 
Corporation, of all indebtedness incurred by DBS for amounts due 
for merchandise and services, 
7. On January 24, 198 5 Appellant filed a Complaint in the 
Third Judicial District Court, State of Utah ("State Court Action" 
hereafter) against DBS and Brady for payment of goods sold and 
delivered to DBS. 
8. On or about February 12, 1985 DBS and Brady filed a 
motion in the State Court Action based on the Utah. Arbitration 
Act 78-31-1 et. seq. Utah Code Annotated and the Federal Arbitra-
tion Act 9 U.S.C. §1 et. seq. for an order dismissing the Complaint 
or staying its prosecution pending arbitration on the grounds 
that the claim was subject to the arbitration provision of the 
Dealership Agreement between Appellant and DBS and that Brady in-
» 
dividually was entitled to protection of that agreement. 
9. On or about March 8, 1985 DBS and Brady filed a document 
encaptioned "Petition to Compel Arbitration" in the United States 
District Court for the Central District of Utah, the trial court 
whose orders are appealled herein. Although encaptioned as a 
Petition to Compel Arbitration, the petition and relief requested 
was limited to orders enjoining litigation by Appellant, directing 
that arbitration proceedings take place in Salt Lake City, Utah, 
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and requesting a specific method of appointing arbitrators, DBS 
and Brady subsequently withdrew their request for a specific 
method of appointing arbitrators. By its terms the subject matter 
of the Petition was limited to alleged controversies asserted in 
Appellant's State Court Action Complaint. 
10. On May 2, 1985 a hearing on Appellees1 Petition to 
Compel Arbitration was held before the Honorable Bruce Jenkins 
in the district court below. Judge Jenkins having been advised 
that Appellees had already filed a motion to dismiss or stay the 
proceedings in the State Court Action, directed Appellees to call 
up their motion before the state court. Judge Jenkins then con-
tinued the hearing until May 31, 1985. 
11. On May 24, 1985 Appellees' motion to dismiss or stay 
proceedings was heard in the State Court Action by the Honorable 
Homer F. Wilkinson. After considering the matters and arguments 
presented to the court, the court ruled that the specific language 
of the Dealership Agreement with reference to collection matters 
took precedence over the general arbitration clause in the Agree-
ment and that therefore the claims asserted by Appellant in its | 
State Court Action Complaint wore not arbitrable. 
12. Sometime after May 2, 1985 the case below was transferred 
from Judge Jenkins to the Honorable J. Thomas Greene. Appellees, 
having learned of the transfer, renoticed a hearing on their 
petition before Judge Greene. 
13. On May 30, 1985 Judge Greene heard arguments on Appellees 
petition and over objection by Appellant that Appellees had 
-4-
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submitted the issue to the state court, which had decided the 
issue, Judge Greene ordered full briefing on the petition and 
continued the hearing to June 27, 1985. 
14. On June 21, 198 5 Appellant filed a Motion to Stay 
Proceedings Pending State Court Determination of Arbitrability 
Issues. 
15. On June 27, 198 5 Judge Greene heard arguments on 
Appellees petition and Appellant's motion to stay and after argu-
ments announced his decision from the bench on that date, which 
was subsequently reduced to writing on August 8, 198 5 and is the 
order appealled herein. 
16. On July 12, 1985 Appellant filed a Motion to Stay Order 
Re Transfer of Arbitration Proceedings with the district court be-
low. That motion was set for hearing on August 22, 1985. 
17. On August 8, 1985 the trial court below entered its 
findings of fact, conclusions of law and order appealled herein. 
Judge Greene stayed the effective date of the transfer order until 
August 22, 198 5 pending a hearing on the motion to stay. 
18. On August 22, 1985 Appellant filed a Motion to Alter 
or Amend Judgment (Rule 59 F.R.C.P.) with the district court. 
19. At the August 22, 1985 hearing on Appellant's motion to 
stay, Judge Greene continued the hearing until September 9, 1985 
and consolidated that hearing with the hearing of Appellant's Rule 
59 motion. Judge Greene continued the stay of the effective date 
of the transfer order contained in the August 8, 1985 order to 
September 9, 1985. 
-5-
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20. On September 9, 1985 Judge Greene heard arguments 
on Appellant's motion to stay and on its Rule 59 motion and ruled 
from the bench denying both motions. This appeal followed. 
Judge Greene's September 9, 198 5 ruling was reduced to writing 
on September 19, 1985. 
(c) 
QUESTIONS PRESENTED 
Following are the principal questions presented on this 
appeal. Other questions may arise during preparation of the 
briefs herein. 
1. Does a forum selection clause of an arbitration agreement 
preclude the court from ordering arbitration in its own district 
if that district is not the forum selected? 
2. Does the trial court have the power to disregard the 
forum selected in a forum selection clause of an arbitration agree-
ment over the objections of one of the parties to the agreement 
regardless of countervailing or compelling circumstances which 
might warrant such a change if the agreement were a commercial 
contract rather than an arbitration agreement? 
3. If a petition to compel arbitration is filed in a forum 
other than the forum selected in a forum selection clause of an 
arbitration agreement, must that court dismiss the petition? 
4. If the trial court can engage in consideration of counter 
vailing or compelling circumstances in disregarding a forum 
selection clause in an arbitration agreement, does the filing of 
a state court complaint on claims which a state court judge ruled 
-6-
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were not arbitrable, and responding to a petition to compel 
arbitration filed in the district court, constitute such compellin 
and countervailing circumstances justifying disregarding the 
forum selected? 
5. Can a party who submitted a Federal Arbitration Act 
motion to stay proceedings before a state court nevertheless 
submit the same claim to a federal court where the state court 
refused its motion? 
6. Based on Appellees1 submission of the issues for a stay 
of proceedings to the state court, did the federal court err 
in refusing to stay its own proceedings? 
7. Does the district court have the power under either §3 
or §4 of the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §1 et. seq. to en-
join either the parties or the court in proceedings pending in a 
state court? 
8. Where a party has consented and is participating in 
arbitration proceedings on claims asserted against it, did the 
district court err in ruling that the party refused to arbitrate 
claims under 9 U.S.C. §4 where the court finds that some allega-
tions in a state court complaint which has as its nexus a credit 
collection claim, could be construed as asserting arbitrable 
issues even though the court finds that the nexus of the complaint 
is not arbitrable? 
9. Where arbitration proceedings are already pending in 
Dallas, Texas in which appellant is participating, may a federal 
district court in Salt Lake City, Utah, notwithstanding a forum 
-7-
fl1K 
selection clause of an arbitration agreement which does not pro-
vide for arbitration in Utah, order consolidation of those proceed-] 
ings in its own district with other matters which it ordered 
arbitrated in Utah? 
10. Did the court err in compelling appellant to assert 
claims against appellees even if appellant elects not to assert 
those claims, and then order those claims arbitrated in Salt Lake 
City, Utah notwithstanding a forum selection clause in an 
arbitration agreement which does not provide for arbitration in 
Salt Lake City, Utah? 
11. Does a party to an arbitration agreement submit itself 
to the jurisdiction of the federal district court by filing a 
credit collection complaint in state court against the other 
party to the agreement, where the arbitration agreement requires 
arbitration outside the jurisdiction of the federal district court?) 
12. Does an alter ego allegation in a state court complaint 
which has as its nexus a credit collection claim, empower the 
court to order a party to arbitrate claims with an individual even 
though that individual has no arbitration agreement with the party 
and has in fact denied the alter ego allegation in his answer to 
the state court complaint? 
13. Did the court err in enjoining prosecution of a claim 
against an individual who signed a personal guaranty guaranteeing 
payment of obligations of a party to an arbitration agreement, 
where that individual is not a party to the arbitration agreement, 
and the guaranty permits suit against the guarantor without the 
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necessity of suit against the principal obligor? 
14. Did the court err in ordering arbitration of claims 
where the petition filed by appellees did not ask for such relief 
and requested merely that arbitration proceedings on claims it 
asserted be held in Salt Lake City, Utah and asked for an in-
junction of claims asserted by appellant in state court? 
15. Is the court's order enjoining litigation of "any and 
all disputes between the parties" over broad to the extent it 
does not specify which disputes are to be enjoined? 
16. Did the court err in enjoining appellant's alter ego 
claim.in the state court action and did it err in compelling 
appellant to assert that claim in arbitration? 
17. Absent a determination by the state court that any 
part of the First and Second Causes of Action of the State Court 
Complaint assert claims different from those arising under separat 
credit agreements between appellant and DBS, i.e. arbitrable clain 
are any valid issues ordered arbitrable which can be consolidated 
with the arbitration proceedings pending in Dallas, Texas justi-
fying transferring those proceedings to Salt Lake City, Utah? 
18. Is the court's arbitration order invalid because it 
lacks specificity as to what issues are to be arbitrated? 
DATED: October 1, 1985 
Gordon R. Mc Dowel1, Jr. 
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant 
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PROOF OF SERVICE 
The undersigned hereby certifies that she mailed a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing Docketing Statement to the 
Plaintiff-Appellees herein, by placing said copy thereof in the 
United States mail, postage prepaid thereon, addressed to Appelleesj 
attorney of record as follows: 
Lynn G. Foster 
Attorney at Law 
602 East Third South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
this 1st day of October, 1985. 
J* '&</& ^' foj^'L/ 
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Gordon R. Mc Dowell, Jr. #2180 
Attorney for Plaintiff-Respondent 
4609 South 2300 East, Suite 104 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117 
Telephone: (801) 272-0309 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF T 
STATE OF UTAH 
DOCUTEL-OLIVETTI CORPORATION, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
DICK BRADY SYSTEMS, INC. 
RICHARD BRADY and DOES 1 
through 10, 
Defendants-Appellants, 
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION 
TO DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS' 
MOTION FOR STAY PENDING 
FEDERAL APPEAL 
Docket No. 20835 
Plaintiff-Respondent Docutel-Olivetti Corporation ("Respondem 
submits the following Memorandum in Opposition to Appellants1 Motic 
for Stay During Federal Appeal. 
OBJECTION TO APPELLANTS1 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondent objects to Appellants' Statement of Facts containec 
in their Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Motion for Stay Dur-
ing Federal Appeal by paragraph number as follows: 
1. The Complaint below was filed on January 24, 198 5 and 
s#erved on Appellants on January 26, 198 5. The Complaint below is 
for goods sold and delivered to Appelants. 
2. On February 12, 1985 Appellants filed a Motion for Dis-
missal or Stay of Proceedings Pending Arbitration with the Court 
below. That motion was based on the Federal Arbitration Act 9 
U.S.C. et. seq. and on the Utah Arbitration Act 78-31-1 et seq. 
U.C.A. Contrary to Appellants1 Statement of Facts, they did not 
A1 1Q 
file a Petition to Compel Arbitration in the Federal District 
Court until March 8, 198 5 more than three weeks after filing the 
Motion to Dismiss in the State Court below. 
3. A hearing was held before Federal Judge Jenkins on May 2, 
1985 on Appellants1 Federal Court petition. At that hearing Judge 
Jenkins, having been advised that Appellants' Motion to Dismiss 
was pending in the State Court, told the Appellants to call up for 
hearing their motion. Judge Jenkins did not differentiate between 
Federal or State issues and did not specifically reserve the 
issue of the Federal Arbitration Act for Federal Court determina-
tion. 
4v Judge Wilkinson's ruling appealled herein did not by its 
terms limit itself to the Utah Arbitration Act. Both Federal and 
State issues were before the Court and the Court must be deemed 
to have considered both issues in reaching its decision. 
5. The Federal District Court case was reassigned to Judge 
Greene after Judge Wilkinson ruled on Appellants' Motion to Dismiss 
appealled herein. Judge Greene, over Respondent's objections that 
Judge Jenkins had referred the matter to the State Court and that 
Appellants had brought their Federal Arbitration Act claim to State 
Court, reconsidered Appellants' Federal Court petition and on June 
27, 198 5 announced the order of the Court from the bench in the 
presence of counsel for Appellants and Respondent herein which such 
order was memorialized in writing on August 8, 1985, a copy of whicJ: 
is attached to Appellants' Memorandum in Support of their stay filec 
herein. 
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1 I. 
2 APPELLANTS' DILEMMA ON THIS APPEAL, 
IF ANY, IS OCCASIONED BY THEIR OWN 
3 FORUM SHOPPING AND SHOULD NOT BE 
ALLOWED AS GROUNDS FOR STAYING 
4 |: THIS APPEAL 
5 f Judge Greene enjoined the parties from litigating in the Stat 
6 j Court all issues other than those issues which the "State Court 
7 rules are claims under separate credit agreements for collection 
8 I of unpaid accounts or otherwise pursuant to paragraph 10 of the 
9 I Dealership Agreement" (Order, August 8, 198 5, paragraph 2, page 2, 
10 lines 7-9). 
11 I Appellants were present in Federal Court on June 27, 1985 
12 || when the Court announced the order which was memorialized in writi: 
13 | on August 8, 198 5, and were aware of the extent of that ruling whe, 
14 || they filed the within Notice of Appeal under Rule 3 U.R.A.P. 
i 
15 (J Judge Wilkinson below, refused to dismiss Respondent's Com-
16 ;! plaint and refused to stay the proceedings below because paragraph 
ji 
17 j 10 of the Dealership Agreement provided for litigation of credit 
18 'I collection claims and therefore was not subject to the general 
19 j arbitration clause of paragraph 12 of the Dealership Agreement be-
'! 
20 | tween the parties (Order appealled herein, dated June 10, 1985 
j 
21 I at p. 1, lines 20-28 and p. 2, lines 1-2) . 
22 | Appellants, having obtained a disfavorable ruling from Judge* 
23 'j Wilkinson, next turned to Judge Greene to consider the same agree-
24 | ment, language and facts which were before Judge Wilkinson in the 
25 1 State Court. Unfortunately Judge Greene, unlike Judge Jenkins, 
26 I failed to recognize Appellants' forum shopping for what it was and 
27 
28 I -3-
A1 41 
proceeded to rule on the merits. Essentially Judge Greene vindi-
cated Respondent's position vis a vis credit collection matters and 
held that those issues were not arbitrable. Judge Greene did rule 
that to the extent the State Court action alleged breaches of the 
Dealership Agreement which were not breaches of credit collection 
claims, those issues should be arbitrated. He therefore enjoined 
prosecution of Respondent's first two causes of action which he 
deemed to be allegations of a breach of the Dealership Agreement 
rather than collection matters. Judge Greene went on to order that 
arbitration proceedings take place in Utah on other matters be-
tween the parties. Judge Greene's authority to order arbitration 
in Utah in contradiction of the forum selection clause of the 
Dealership Agreement between the parties, is the subject matter of 
Respondent's presently pending appeal before the Tenth Circuit 
Court of Appeals. 
Appellants having now failed to stop the credit collection 
claims before both Judge Wilkinson and Judge Greene, next turned 
to this Court and filed a Notice of Appeal herein under Rule 3 
U.R.A.P. even though the order appealled was clearly interlocutory. 
As a consequence of this Court's refusal to dismiss the appeal undeJi 
Rule 3 as being interlocutory, Appellants obtained from this Court, 
without cost or detriment to them and without a ruling on the merits 
by this Court, the very stay of the proceedings below denied them 
by Judge Wilkinson and Judge Greene. 
Having obtained the de facto stay of the proceedings below 
and being advised that this Court had advanced the appeal herein 
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on its calendar (Order of this Court dated September 3, 1985) 
Appellants1 now ask this Court to make the stay permanent by de-
ferring any further proceedings herein pending the outcome of the 
appeal to the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals. 
If Appellants are placed "in a dilemma of compelling them to 
violate Judge Greene's injunction by proceeding to the merits befc 
this Court" (Memorandum in Support of Defendants1 Motion for Stay 
During Federal Appeal) it is a dilemma created not by this Court 
but by Appellants own blatant forum shopping in these proceedings/ 
and by Appellants1 filing of the appeal herein knowing of Judge 
Greene's ruling from the bench on June 27, 1985, memorialized 
August 8, 198 5. 
II. 
THIS COURT SHOULD IN FACT DISMISS 
THIS APPEAL RATHER THAN STAY 
THE PROCEEDINGS HEREIN 
Appellants' motion herein to stay this appeal process and the 
memorandum in support thereof clearly demonstrate the evil associ-
ated with forum shopping. Appellants were denied relief first by 
Judge Jenkins, then by Judge Wilkinson and finally by Judge Greene 
yet nonetheless continue to seek de facto from this Court what the 
have been denied by a series of judges, Federal and State, a stay 
of Respondent's credit collection claim. As argued by Respondent 
previously before this Court, the appeal herein is interlocutory 
and an appeal thereon should not have been granted. Rather than 
stay the proceedings herein, this appeal should be dismissed and 
the matter referred back to the Trial Court for a determination on 
-5-
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the merits of Respondent's credit collection claim. 
Respectfully submitted this 18th day of September^ 1985, 
'" x. ^ ^ L 
Gordon R. Mc Dowell, Jr. 
Attorney for Plaintiff-Respondent 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
The undersigned hereby certifies that she mailed a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing Memorandum in Opposition, etc. to 
the Appellants herein, by placing said copy thereof in the United 
States mail, postage prepaid thereon, addressed as follows: 
Lynn G. Foster 
Attorney at Law 
602 East Third South •' 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
this 19th day of September, 1985. 
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Gordon R. Mc Dowell, Jr. #2180 
Attorney for Plaintiff-Respondent 
4609 South 2300 East, Suite 104 
Salt'Lake City, Utah 84117 
Telephone: (801) 272-0309 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
DOCUTEL-OLIVETTI CORPORATION, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
DICK BRADY SYSTEMS, INC. 
RICHARD BRADY and DOES 1 
through 10, 
Defendants-Appellants. 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT'S 
MOTIONS TO EXPEDITE APPEAL, 
COMPEL DISCOVERY, APPOINT 
A RECEIVER OR REQUIRE A BOND 
PENDING APPEAL, AND TO DEFINE 
SCOPE OF TRIAL COURT'S 
JURISDICTION 
Docket No. 20835 
Plaintiff-Respondent Docutel-Olivetti Corporation ("Responden 
submits the within memorandum in support of its various motions. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS AND 
PROCEEDINGS TO DATE 
On January 24, 1985 Respondent filed its Complaint below. 
A copy of that Complaint is attached hereto as Exhibit "A". 
The Appellants were served with process on January 26, 198 5 
and on February 12, 1985 the Appellants filed a Motion for Dis-
missal* or Stay of Proceedings Pending Arbitration, a copy of that 
motion and the supporting memorandum is attached hereto as Exhibit 
"B". Appellants' motion was heard on May 24, 1985 and on June. 10, 
198 5 Judge Homer F. Wilkinson entered his order denying Appellants 
motion to dismiss the proceedings and further denied the motion to 
stay the proceedings pending arbitration. 
On or about June 14, 198 5 Appellants filed their Answer and 
Counterclaim herein, a copy of that Answer is attached hereto as 
Exhibit "C" . 
On June 28, 198 5 Respondent served a Notice of Deposition 
on Richard Brady scheduling his deposition for July 8, 1985. 
(See Exhibit "A" to the Affidavit of Gordon R. Mc Dowell, Jr. In 
Support of Motions ("Mc Dowell Affidavit")). On July 2, 1985 at 
Appellants1 request Mr. Brady's deposition was rescheduled to 
August 5, 1985 (See Exhibit "B" to the Mc Dowell Affidavit). On 
July 2, 1985 Respondent filed and served a Notice to Produce Doc-
uments and a Notice of Deposition under Rule 30(b)(6) U.R.C.P. 
(See Exhibits "C" and "D" to the Mc Dowell Affidavit). On July 
19, 198 5 Respondent served Interrogatories, Request for Admissions 
and Request for Production of Documents on Appellants (See Exhibit 
"E" of the Mc Dowell Affidavit). 
On July 8, 1985 Appellants filed their Notice of Appeal of 
the June 10, 198 5 order and that appeal was assigned Docket No. 
20783. The Notice of Appeal was filed in 20783 prior to entry by 
the court of its order dated July 1CJ, 1985 on Appellants' motion 
to reconsider the June 10, 1985 order. On July 10, 1985 Respondent 
filed a Motion to Dismiss Appeal with the Supreme Court in Case 
No. 20783 and on August 6, 19B5 the Supreme Court entered its order 
granting Respondent's Motion to Dismiss Appeal and dismissed 
Appellants1 appeal in Case No. 20783. 
On August 5, 1985 Appellants failed to appear at their deposi-
tion and further failed to deliver the documents requested in the 
notice to produce documents and further refused to grant any dis-
covery below on the grounds of the pending appeal in Docket No. 
-2-
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20783 (See Exhibit "F" to the Mc Dowell Affidavit). 
On August 8, 198 5 Respondent filed a motion to the Court 
below for an order compelling discovery and for sanctions. On or 
about the same date Appellants filed a new Notice of Appeal which 
was assigned the docket number herein, 20835. 
On August 15, 1985 Appellants filed a Motion to Vacate Dis-
missal and Reinstate Appeal in Docket No. 20783. On August 22, 
1985 Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss Appeal No. 20835. 
On August 23, 19 8 5 Respondent's Motion to Compel Discovery wa 
heard by Judge Wilkinson who denied the motion because he had been 
divested of jurisdiction by the various appeals filed by Appellant 
herein. That ruling was memorialized on September 6, 1985 (See 
Exhibit "G" to the Mc Dowell Affidavit)'. 
On September 3, 1985 Appellants' Motions to Reinstate Appeal 
No. 20783 and Respondent's Motion to Dismiss Appeal No. 20835 were 
heard by this Court. On September 3, 1985 this Court denied the 
Motion to Reinstate Appeal Number 20783 and denied the Motion to 
Dismiss Appeal Number 20835. 
POINTS, AUTHORITIES 
AND ARGUMENT 
I. 
The Appeal Herein Although Granted Under Rule 3 U.R.A.P. 
By This Court Is Interlocutory 
The proceedings below have not been completed. Indeed Appell 
ants have refused to grant discovery below. All that has taken pi 
below is a Complaint, denial of a Motion to Dismiss or Stay 
-3-
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Proceedings and an Answer and Counterclaim. By any definition, 
this appeal is interlocutory. Kennedy v New Era Industries, Inc. 
600 P.2d 534 (Utah 1979); Salt Lake City Corporation v Layton 600 
P.2d 538 (Utah 1979); Pate v. Marathon Steel Company 692 P.2d 765 
(Utah 1984) . 
II. 
The Appeal Herein Being Interlocutory Has Not Divested 
The Trial Court Of Jurisdiction Below And The Trial 
Court Should Be Allowed To Continue The Proceedings 
Below Including Discovery Proceedings Pending 
The Appeal. 
Generally an appeal is taken from a final judgment into which 
is merged all of the former proceedings. Since the appealable 
judgment contains all of the proceedings an appeal naturally brings 
the Trial Court's participation to an end until such time as the 
Appellate Court remits the proceedings. In this case, however, 
no final judgment on the merits has been rendered and much of the 
proceedings including discovery need to be completed. Appellants 
take the position that an appeal of any issue totally deprives the 
District Court of jurisdiction. 
An analogous situation has been presented in domestic relations 
cases in Utah. In those cases, although there may have been a final 
determination as to some issues, e.g. property matters, support, 
etc., an appeal of that judgment does not divest the District Court 
of jurisdiction with respect to unresolved matters. (See generally 
Peters v Peters 394 P.2d 71 (UT. 1971); Warren v Warren 642 P.2d 
385 (UT. 1982) . 
-4-
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In Grand Central Mining Co. v Mammoth Mining Co, 36 Utah 364, 
104 P. 573 (UT ) appellants argued that an appeal of a counter-
claim stayed proceedings on the original Complaint and objected 
to certain orders entered therein by the District Court. This 
Court held that only the counterclaim issues were before it and 
only those issues were stayed below and the Trial Court retained 
jurisdiction to proceed on the Complaint itself. The Court held: 
"The case reviewed by us embracing only the issues 
and the proceedings involved in the counterclaim, 
and which were necessarily adjudged by us to be in-
dependent of, and separate from, the then untried 
and undetermined issues raised by the complaint, 
we do not see wherein the district court was with-
out jurisdiction to proceed as was done, especially 
since its action, was not arrested nor stayed by a 
supersedeas bond or otherwise." 
Grand Central Mining Co. v Mammoth Mining Co. 
Id. at 577 
The District Court1s jurisdiction is provided in Article VIII 
Section 5 of the Constitution of Utah and in §78-3-4 U.C.A. 
§78-3-4 grants the District Court jurisdiction in all matters civi 
and criminal not excepted in the Constitution and not prohibited b 
law. Under the Constitution and the statute the trial court canno 
be divested of its jurisdiction by the filing of an appeal. 
District 
Since the/\ Court cannot be divested of its jurisdiction what 
Appellants actually claim is that the appeal of the June 10, 1985 
order acts as a stay of all other proceedings below./, including 
discovery, a "supersedeas". Supersedeas in defined in Blacks Law 
Dictionary 5th ed. as follows: 
"The name of a writ containing a command to stay the 
proceeding at law." 
The text writers explain the relationship between an appeal 
and supersedeas as follows: 
"Originally supersedeas was a writ directed 
to an officer, commanding him to desist from 
enforcing the execution of another writ which 
he was about to execute or which might come 
into his hands. It is now often used 
synonymously with a stay of proceedings, and 
is employed to designate the effect of an 
act or proceeding which of itself suspends 
the enforcement of a judgment." 
4 AM JUR 2d. Appeal and Error, §634 
In these proceedings there has been no judgment or order upon 
which an automatic stay on appeal would issue. What Appellants 
urge is that the entire proceedings be stayed not just the order 
appealed from. The text writers answer this assertion as follows: 
"... the general rule under modern statutes 
in most jurisdictions in this country is 
that the writ of error or appeal does not 
of itself operate as a supersedeas." 
4 AM JUR 2d. Appeal and Error, §365 
There is no provision in Utah statutory law permitting supersedeas 
in these proceedings. The text writers state: 
"In the absence of express statutory auth-
orization, it is apparent that the appellant 
is not entitled to supersedeas or stay of 
proceedings as a matter of right." 
4 AM JUR 2d. Appeal and Error, §366 
The only provisions for supersedeas (stay of proceedings)' in 
Utah law are found in Rule 6 2(d) U.R.C.P. where a stay may be ob-
tained from execution of a judgment; in Rule 5(d) U.R.A.P. where 
discretionary review from interlocutory orders is provided; and 
under Rule 8 U.R.A.P. where an application for a stay of the 
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judgment or order of a District Court is provided. In each of 
these cases an application must be made and each provides for post-
ing of a bond. Nowhere is there any authority that filing an appea 
on an order of the type appealled from herein, automatically stays 
the trial court proceedings. It cannot be the rule that by filing 
an appeal on any issue all proceedings grind to a halt without any 
protection to other parties in litigation. 
This Court should order as it could have ordered upon consid-
eration of a Rule 5 U.R.A.P. request for an interlocutory appeal, 
that only the issue of arbitration will be considered and that the 
trial court retains jurisdiction of all other proceedings including 
discovery. If this Court determines that the trial court has been 
divested of jurisdiction by this appeal or that the entire proceed-
ings below should be stayed pending the appeal then it should pro-
tect Respondent during the pendency of this appeal, by requiring 
Appellants to post a bond in the amount of $59,252.60 being the 
amount prayed for in the Complaint and that such bond should remain 
in place through conclusion of the trial COULL proceedings on re-
mand . 
Respondent prevailed below and until this Court rules other-
wise, the June 10, 1985 order appealled from herein must be pre-
sumed to be correct. Appellants without any protection whatsoever 
to Respondent, should not be able to obtain the relief denied be-
low (Stay of Proceedings) by the simple expediency of filing a 
Notice of Appeal herein. Were such a result to prevail, the pro-
ceedings before the trial court would be a useless act and the part; 
1 I; 
2 I; 
3!i 
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may just as well litigate their claims before this Court, which is 
exactly what is happening herein. 
III. 
Respondent Is A Secured Creditor Of Appellant 
Dick Brady Systems, Inc. And Is Entitled 
To The Remedies Of A Secured Creditor Herein 
The Dealership Agreement between Respondent and Appellant Dick 
Brady Systems, Inc. (See copy of Agreement attached to Exhibit "A" 
hereof) paragraph 10 provides inter alia: 
"Dealer hereby grants Olivetti a security 
interest in all Olivetti brand equipment 
and inventory which Dealer presently owns 
or may hereafter acquire and any additions 
or accessions thereto and the proceeds there-
of" 
If an event of default by Dealer occurs 
under any credit agreement with Olivetti, 
Olivetti may, among other remedies, avail 
itself of any remedy in effect now or at 
the time of default under the Uniform 
Commercial Code or any similar statute." 
Respondent has perfected a security interest against Appellant 
Dick Brady Systems. Attached hereto as Exhibit "D" is a certified 
copy of the Financing Statement on file in Utah. 
The Affidavit of Gilbert R. Peterson filed below (see Exhibit 
"E" hereto) attaches thereto a copy of an invoice typical of all 
invoices shipped to Appellants in connection with the purchase of 
products from Respondent. That invoice provides: 
"A/R Terms: Due in 60 days." 
Mr. Peterson in paragraph 4, page 2 of his affidavit states: 
-8-
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"When products are purchased by a dealer 
those products are shipped and an invoice 
is generated and mailed. In most cases the 
invoice is mailed within a few days after 
products are shipped." 
Mr. Peterson goes on to state in paragraph 6, page 3 of his 
affidavit that: 
"There is nothing in my records reflecting 
that Dick Brady Systems, Inc. did not receive 
invoice 01-253052 nor any of the other 32 out-
standing invoices. There is no record in my 
files, nor am I aware of any record, reflect-
ing that Dick Brady Systems, Inc. ever object-
ed to any of the 33 outstanding invoices 
including the terms of payment thereunder." 
Section 70A-2-607 Utah Code Annotated (1953 as supple-
mented) provides in part: 
"(1) The buyer must pay at the contract 
rate for any goods accepted." 
"(3) Where a tender has been accepted 
(a) The buyer must within a reasonable 
time after he discovers or should have dis-
covered any breach notify the seller of 
breach or be barred from any remedy..." 
Section 70A-2-606 Utah Code Annotated provides in part: 
"70A-2-606. What constitutes acceptance of 
goods. 
(1) Acceptance of goods occurs when the 
buyer 
(b) fails to make an effective rejection 
(subsection (1) of section 70A-2-602), but 
such acceptance does not occur until the buyer 
has had a reasonable opportunity to inspect 
them..." 
Section 70A-2-602(l) provides: 
"Rejection of goods must be within a reason-
able time after their delivery or tender. 
It is ineffective unless the buyer season-
ally notifies the seller." 
Section 70A-2-201(2) Utah Code Annotated provides: 
"(2) Between merchants if within a reasonable 
time a writing in confirmation of the contract 
and sufficient against the sender is received 
and the party receiving it has reason to know 
of its contents, it satisfies the require-
ment of subsection (1) against such party 
unless written notice of objection to its 
contents is given within ten days after it is 
received..." 
The net effect of the above qi loted sections is that where 
goods have been delivered and accepted by a buyer that buyer must 
pay for those goods at the contract rate. Goods are accepted 
when the buyer fails to reject the goods and so notify the seller 
within a reasonable period of time thereafter of the rejection. 
The terms of the contract are established where a confirmation 
of the terms is sent to the buyer and the buyer fails to object 
to the terms within ten days. 
Mr. Peterson in his affidavit states that invoices are mailed 
a few days after shipment of goods and that those invoices contain 
the payment terms for the goods shipped. Mr. Peterson further 
states' in paragraph 6, page 3 of his affidavit that there are 
Furesently 33 outstanding invoices totaling $49,147.70, the latest 
of which is dated November 27, 1984. Mr. Peterson further testi-
fies that there are no records reflecting that Dick Brady Systems 
failed to receive the invoices or objected thereto. 
More than a year has elapsed since shipment of 
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many of the goods and invoices forming the nexus of Respondent's 
claim against Appellants, were shipped and mailed. Appellants hav< 
failed to reject delivery of those goods or object to the payment 
terms therefor. Under the foregoing statutes Appellants must pay 
for those goods, 
§7QA-9~503 Utah Code Annotated entitles a secured creditor 
such as Respondent, to take possession of collateral upon default, 
Appellants have defaulted in payment for the goods sold to them ar 
Respondent is entitled to possession of the collateral set forth j 
the Financing Statement on file in Utah and under the Security 
Agreement contained in the Dealership Agreement. 
§70A-9-503 provides for either a writ of replevin or other 
legal process to enable a creditor to obtain possession of the 
collateral. Respondent asks this Court to appoint a receiver to 
account for, identify and take possession of the collateral as 
provided in §70A~9-503 U.C.A. 
IV. 
Respondent Should Be Permitted To Conduct 
Discovery During This Interlocutory Appeal 
As set forth above, the proceedings below have barely begun 
and Appellants have refused to grant discovery to Respondent. 
Respondent is a secured creditor entitled to know what has 
happened to its collateral and the legal reasons why Appellants re 
fuse to pay for goods sold to them. Respondent is entitled to 
delivery of collateral securing Appellants' indebtedness to it. 
Appellants have refused to give Respondent any information concern 
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the kind, extent, value, identity or location of its collateral. 
Further Appellants deny that there is any credit agreement between 
t 1 ie parties at all. 
It is obvious that these Appellants intend to drag this appeal 
out as long as possible (See Appellants' Motion to Stay Proceedings 
Pending Federal Appeal filed herein dated September 16, 198 5 and 
Appellants'Motion to Vacate and Strike Dates for Filing Briefs and 
for Extension of Time filed herein and dated September 17, 1985) in 
a concerted effort to obtain by procedural maneuvering that which 
was denied them below (Stay of Proceedings). Respondent should be 
entitled to at least conduct discovery during this appeal. 
Discovery will be necessary below if the Appellants are unsuccessful 
appeal and will greatly expedite the trial below on remand. Res.-
pondent is certainly entitled to know the reasons why the Appellant* 
claim they donft owe for goods sold and delivered to them and the 
status and location of the collateral securing Appellants' indebted-
ness to Respondent. 
Even if the Appellants were to prevail on appeal herein, the 
discovery conducted would be necessary in arbitration proceedings 
and would expedite those proceedings. 
Respondent, having prevailed below, should not be deprived 
of discovery by this appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellants are fond of characterizing Judge Wilkinson's 
order appealled herein as an "anti-arbitration" order. In fact 
the order is no such thing. The order b; it.; ' *.-:Tn- i^tes that the 
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credit collection claims are not arbitrable. It is neither pro 
nor anti arbitration. It says simply that arbitration does not 
apply. Appellants attempt to confuse the issues herein by invokir 
a sacred arbitration right and characterizing any position contrai 
to their own as "anti-arbitration". 
A Federal and State judge have now looked at their arguments 
and. both agreed that the credit collection claims are not subject 
to arbitration. Unfortunately this Court, by granting an appeal 
under Rule 3 U.R.A.P., has caused the District Court to conclude 
that it has no further jurisdiction below thereby giving to 
Appellants the relief denied them by a succession of Federal and 
State judges without any protection or consideration of the rights 
of Respondent herein. Respondent by these motions suggests some 
relief herein which this Court might grant to it. The Court might 
15 ji consider other relief which would accomplish the goal of giving 
16 
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Appellants an opportunity to convince this Court that the credit 
collection claims are arbitrable without totally depriving Respond 
ent of an effective remedy below. 
0 
Respectfully submitted this / O day of September, 1985, 
Gordon R. Mc Dowell, Jr. 
Attorney for Plaintiff-Respondent 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
The undersigned hereby certifies that she mailed a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing Memorandum, etc. to the Appellants 
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herein, by placing said copy thereof in the United States mail, 
postage prepaid thereon, addressed as follows: 
Lynn G. Foster 
Attorney at Law 
602 East Third South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
^is /? daY of September, 1985. 
j^Oo/Jg yf ^^DA^y 
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
DISTRICT OF UTAH - CENTRAL DIVISIO.. 
In the Matter of the Arbitration 
betwen DICK BRADY SYSTEMS, INC., 
a Utah corporation, and RICHARD 
BRADY, ORDER 
Petitioners, 
vs. 
Civil No. C85-280G 
DOCUTEL-OLIVETTI CORPORATION, 
Respondent. 
The above entitled matter came before the Court on the 
27th day of June 1985, at the hour of 3:00 p.m.; Lynn G. Foster 
and John R. Merkling appeared for Petitioners and Gordon R. 
McDowell appeared for Respondent; the Court considered the 
memoranda and documents filed by the parties and heard extensive 
argument of counsel, after which the matter was submitted to the 
Court for decision and taken under advisement. The Court now 
being fully advised, and having entered Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law, enters the following Order: 
1. Docutel-Olivetti Corporation, Dick Brady Systems, 
Inc. and Richard Brady, their agents, employees, successors, 
assigns and attorneys are hereby restrained and enjoined from 
proceeding in litigation in either Federal or State Courts as to 
any and all disputes between the parties arising under the 
Dealership Agreement or pertaining in any manner to the 
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dealership created thereby, including to the extent applicable 
claims which Docutel asserts against Systems and Brady under the 
First and Second Causes of Action set forth in Docutelfs 
Complaint, pending in the Third Judicial District Court in and 
for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, Civil No. C85-506, except to 
the extent that the relief sought thereunder shall be ruled by 
the said state court to be based upon claims under separate 
credit agreements for collection of unpaid accounts or otherwise 
pursuant to paragraph 10 of the Dealership Agreement. The 
parties are enjoined from proceeding further in litigation in the 
aforesaid State Court Complaint as to the Third cause of action 
set forth therein. Docutel may proceed in State Court as to the 
Fourth Cause of Action set forth in the aforesaid State Court 
Complaint as authorized by paragraph 10 of the Dealership 
Agreement. Nothing herein shall be construed to prohibit any 
party from pursuing litigation remedies for enforcement of rights 
arising under the Dealership Agreement, or rights under the 
personal guaranty of Richard Brady, in connection with any award 
which may be reduced to judgment pursuant to arbitration 
proceedings. 
2„ The parties, including Richard Brady, are ordered 
to proceed to arbitration as to all disputes and claims arising 
under the Dealership Agreement or pertaining in any manner to the 
dealership created by the Dealership Agreement, including to the 
extent applicable the First and Second Causes of Action, and the 
claims set forth in the Third Cause of Action, in the pending 
case in state court, Civil No. 85-506. 
3. Except as provided herein, it is ordered that 
hearings and proceedings between the parties in arbitration as to 
disputes and claims arising under or pertaining in any manner to 
the dealership created by the Dealership Agreement as set forth 
at paragraph 12 therein, shall be held and take place within the 
District of Utah, Effective August 20, 1985, unless this Court 
grants Respondent's pending Motion to Stay, it is ordered that 
all issues between the parties currently in arbitration elsewhere 
shall be transferred to the District of Utah and consolidated 
with the issues and matters which this Court has placed in 
arbitration in the District of Utah pursuant to this Order. 
4. No costs or attorney's fees are awarded herewith 
to any party. 
DATED: August O , 1985. 
J. /DHOMAS GREENE 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
cc: 
